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 (i) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., permits 
interception of “radio communications” that are not 
“scrambled or encrypted.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).  
The Act itself does not define “radio communications,” 
but for decades the accepted meaning of the term in the 
telecommunications field—and in a closely related stat-
ute, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.— 
has broadly encompassed all transmissions made using 
radio waves.  That definition undisputedly includes the 
unencrypted Wi-Fi transmissions at issue in this case.  
The question presented is:    
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 
“radio communications” under the Wiretap Act are re-
stricted to “predominantly auditory broadcasts” and do 
not include Wi-Fi communications even though Wi-Fi 
communications are transmitted using radio waves. 
 (ii) 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant-appellant in the court of appeals, who is 
petitioner here, is Google Inc. 
Plaintiffs-appellees in the court of appeals, who are 
respondents here, are: Benjamin Joffe, Lilla Marigza, 
Rick Benitti,  Bertha Davis, Jason Taylor, Eric Myhre, 
John E. Redstone, Matthew Berlage, Patrick Keyes, 
Karl H. Schulz, James Fairbanks, Aaron Linsky, Dean 
M. Bastilla, Vicki Van Valin, Jeffrey Colman, Russell 
Carter, Stephanie Carter, and Jennifer Locsin. 
 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Google Inc. does not have a parent corporation, and 
no publicly-held company owns ten percent or more of 
Google Inc.’s stock. 
 (iii) 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
 
No. 13- 
 
GOOGLE INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOFFE,  et al., 
Respondents. 
 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 
Petitioner Google Inc. (“Google”) respectfully peti-
tions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-30a) is 
not yet published but is available at 2013 WL 6905957.  
That opinion amended a prior opinion (App. 31a-64a), 
which is reported at 729 F.3d 1262.  The opinion of the 
district court (App. 65a-101a) is reported at 794 F. 
Supp. 2d 1067. 
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JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered 
on September 10, 2013.  The court granted in part a pe-
tition for rehearing and filed an amended opinion on 
December 27, 2013.  This Court has jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Relevant provisions of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510 et seq., are reproduced in the Appendix. 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT 
This case concerns the application of the Wiretap 
Act, a criminal statute governing the interception of 
electronic and wire communications, to Wi-Fi and other 
technologies that involve the transmission of infor-
mation using radio waves.  The Ninth Circuit held that 
the statutory exemption for acquisition of unencrypted 
“radio communications” was not applicable because Wi-
Fi transmissions are not “predominantly auditory 
broadcasts.”  But that interpretation has no basis in the 
statutory text, is at odds with decades of understanding 
of the meaning of “radio communication” in telecommu-
nications law, and is irreconcilable with modern com-
munications technology, which does not distinguish be-
tween the transmission of auditory and other data files.  
Accordingly, if left uncorrected, the court of appeals’ 
decision will lead to confusion and uncertainty, particu-
larly for the information technology industry and its 
tens of millions of customers.    
1. The Wiretap Act broadly prohibits the inter-
ception of wire and electronic communications, but al-
lows interception of “an electronic communication made 
through an electronic communication system that is 
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configured so that such electronic communication is 
readily accessible to the general public.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  The Act expressly provides that “radio 
communications” are “readily accessible to the general 
public”—and thus exempt from the prohibition on in-
terception—if they are not “scrambled or encrypted” 
(or transmitted in another restricted manner specified 
in the Act).  Id. § 2510(16)(A).  The question at issue in 
this case is whether unencrypted Wi-Fi communica-
tions, which are undisputedly carried over radio waves, 
are “radio communications” and thus not subject to the 
Wiretap Act’s ban on interception. 
2. The term “Wi-Fi” refers to “a wireless local ar-
ea network that uses radio waves to connect computers 
and other devices to the Internet.”  Webster’s New Col-
lege Dictionary 1636 (Michael Agnes ed., Wiley Publ’g, 
Inc. 2007).  Wi-Fi transmissions are broadcast wireless-
ly to users over radio waves by devices known as rout-
ers or access points.  See Commonwealth Scientific & 
Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc., 542 F.3d 
1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that in a Wi-Fi 
network, “remote devices communicate with the net-
work access points by way of radio wave transmis-
sions”).  Wi-Fi networks operate on a specific portion of 
the radio spectrum allocated by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC).  See In the Matter of Au-
thorization of Spread Spectrum and Other Wideband 
Emissions Not Presently Provided for in the FCC 
Rules and Regulations, 101 F.C.C.2d 419, 428-430 
¶¶ 27-37 (1985).  Wi-Fi is now the most common meth-
od for accessing the Internet.  Newton’s Telecom Dic-
tionary 1265 (26th ed. 2011).  Every Wi-Fi device is as-
signed a unique number called a media access control 
(MAC) address, and routers and other access points are 
assigned an alpha-numeric service set identifier (SSID).  
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See Jacobson & Idziorek, Computer Security Literacy: 
Staying Safe in a Digital World 195, 208 (2013).  Rout-
ers broadcast those SSIDs, which can be detected by 
computers, smartphones, and other devices with wire-
less capability.  Id. at 195, 205.   
The owner of a Wi-Fi network can choose to en-
crypt the network, often requiring users to enter a 
password before joining.  Encryption prevents others 
from using the network and blocks public access to the 
information transmitted over the network.  An unen-
crypted or open network is not similarly protected, and 
the information transmitted across the network may be 
acquired by the public.  Indeed, Wi-Fi networks may be 
used to broadcast information to the public, such as 
subtitles translating live theater or advertisements 
broadcast to users of a public network.  See Theatre 
Performances Available in Eight Languages, BBC 
News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8380266.stm 
(last updated Nov. 26, 2009); Free Wireless Upgrades at 
Metro Airport Include Unlimited Minutes, Detroit 
Free Press, Sept. 17, 2013, at A9. 
3. Google is a company specializing in Internet-
related services and products.  Among its many prod-
ucts is an online mapping service called Street View,  
which provides panoramic, street-level photographs.  
App. 3a.  Cameras mounted on cars that drive down 
public roads take the photographs available through 
Street View.  Id.  During the relevant period, the cars 
were also equipped with off-the-shelf radio equipment 
and commercially available software that allowed Google 
to collect identifying network information (MAC ad-
dresses and SSIDs) from Wi-Fi networks along the road.  
Id.  Google collected that network identifying infor-
mation to enhance its “location aware” services, which 
allow users to retrieve geographically relevant infor-
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mation about local weather, nearby restaurants, and 
points of interest.  Id.  Because Wi-Fi networks have a 
limited range, networks can act as unique landmarks 
that make it possible to estimate mobile device users’ 
locations.  Many databases of network identifying infor-
mation exist for this purpose.  See McKinsey Global 
Inst., Big Data:  The Next Frontier for Innovation, 
Competition, and Productivity 85-94 (2011), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/
big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation. 
In addition to collecting identifying information 
about Wi-Fi networks, Google’s  Street View cars also 
collected so-called “payload data” that was sent over 
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks if the data was being 
broadcast at the moment the Street View cars passed 
within range of the networks.  App. 4a.  Google did not 
use any of this data in any product or service.  Upon 
learning of the collection of payload data, Google took 
its Street View cars off the road and segregated the 
payload data the cars had collected.  Id.   
The Department of Justice, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the FCC opened investigations of 
Google, including for possible violations of the Wiretap 
Act and Communications Act.  All three ultimately de-
clined to take enforcement action.  See Kerr, Justice 
Department Closes Probe Into Google Street View, 
CNET, Apr. 26, 2012, available at http://news
.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57422652-93/justice-department-
closes-probe-into-google-street-view/; Ltr. to Gidari, 
Esq., Counsel for Google, from Vladeck, Director, Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 27, 2010), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/clos
ing_letters/google-inquiry/101027googleletter.pdf; In the 
Matter of Google Inc., 27 FCC Rcd 4012 (2012). 
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4. In response to Google’s public acknowledg-
ment, more than a dozen putative class-action lawsuits 
were filed around the country, and eventually trans-
ferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
to the Northern District of California.  App. 4a.  Re-
spondents allege that payload data transmitted over 
their unencrypted Wi-Fi networks was collected by 
Google and seek to represent a class of all individuals 
whose Wi-Fi payload data was similarly collected.  Id.  
Respondents filed a consolidated class action complaint 
asserting violations of the federal Wiretap Act as well 
as various state wiretap laws and California’s unfair 
competition law.  Id. 
5. The district court dismissed Respondents’ 
state-law claims on preemption and standing grounds, 
but held that Respondents’ complaint stated a claim 
under the Wiretap Act.  App. 65a-101a.1  The court rec-
ognized that 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16), which establishes 
that unencrypted radio communications are “readily 
accessible to the general public,” serves to define the 
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i), which permits the ac-
quisition of “electronic communications” that are “read-
ily accessible to the general public.”  Because all radio 
communications are a form of electronic communica-
tion, the court held that the acquisition of such commu-
nications in unencrypted form is exempt from liability 
under the Wiretap Act.  App. 86a, 89a.  Thus, the court 
concluded, radio communications are “readily accessible 
to the general public” and not covered by the Wiretap 
Act unless the radio communications are “scrambled or 
encrypted” or transmitted by one of the other restrict-
ed methods specified in § 2510(16). 
                                                 
1 Judge Ware issued the order under review; Judge Breyer 
now presides over the proceedings in the district court in this case. 
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But the court then defined “radio communication” 
narrowly so as to exclude unencrypted Wi-Fi transmis-
sions.  “Radio communication” is undefined in the Wire-
tap Act, but the district court declined to give the term 
its ordinary meaning—and the meaning it has long held 
in the telecommunications field—of simply all commu-
nications transmitted via radio waves.  Instead, the 
court held that “radio communication” includes only 
“traditional radio services,” or “public-directed radio 
broadcast communication,” and not other technologies 
that communicate via radio waves such as unencrypted 
Wi-Fi networks and cellular phones.  App. 87a-90a.  
Having concluded that unencrypted Wi-Fi transmis-
sions are not “radio communications,” the court held 
that Respondents had adequately alleged that those 
transmissions were “electronic communications” not 
“readily accessible to the general public” under 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) and thus subject to the Wiretap Act’s in-
terception prohibition.  App. 92a-95a. 
Google asked the district court to certify its Wire-
tap Act ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).  The district court granted Google’s request, 
and the Ninth Circuit granted Google’s petition for 
permission to appeal.  
6. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  App. 1a-30a.  Like 
the district court, the court of appeals held that the def-
inition of radio communications “readily accessible to 
the general public” in § 2510(16) applies to the 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption to the prohibition on intercep-
tion of electronic communications.  App. 8a-10a.  The 
court explained that the Act expressly provides that 
“radio communication” is a subset of “electronic com-
munication,” and noted that “the statute directs us to 
apply § 2510(16) to the entire chapter.”  App. 8a-9a.  
Thus, the appeals court concluded, a radio communica-
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tion is deemed “readily accessible to the general public” 
and not covered by the Wiretap Act unless “scrambled 
or encrypted” or transmitted in another manner speci-
fied in § 2510(16).  App. 10a-11a. 
Rejecting both the district court’s definition and 
the one offered by Respondents, however, the court of 
appeals created its own unprecedented and untenably 
narrow definition of “radio communication.”  The court 
acknowledged that because “radio communication” is 
not defined in the Wiretap Act, the court should give 
the term its ordinary meaning.  App. 11a.  Neverthe-
less, it rejected the conclusion that “radio communica-
tion” under the Wiretap Act, as in other related stat-
utes, refers simply to any information transmitted us-
ing radio waves.  App. 12a-14a.  Instead, in the court of 
appeals’ view, the “ordinary meaning” of the term “ra-
dio communication” is “a predominantly auditory 
broadcast.”  App. 15a.  Thus, the court held that be-
cause the Wi-Fi transmissions Google acquired were 
not “predominantly auditory,” they did not constitute 
radio communications under the Act.  App. 15a-16a. 
In so holding, the court gave the phrases “radio 
communication” and “communication by radio”—both 
of which are used in the Wiretap Act—fundamentally 
different constructions.  The court concluded that Con-
gress intended to use the latter phrase “more expan-
sively” to include “all communications using radio 
waves or a radio device.”  App. 16a-17a.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court declined to apply the estab-
lished definition in the Communications Act, which ex-
pressly defines “radio communication” and “communi-
cation by radio” to mean the same thing: “the transmis-
sion by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and 
sounds of all kinds.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(40); App. 13a-25a.  
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The court of appeals denied Google’s request for 
rehearing en banc on December 27, 2013.2 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
The term “radio communication” has for decades 
had an accepted meaning in the telecommunications 
field: a transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, 
or sounds using radio waves.  That meaning dates back 
at least to the Communications Act of 1934, and is the 
established understanding of the term applied by 
courts and by the FCC.  Here, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected that long-established definition.  Instead, 
the court of appeals grafted an unprecedented limita-
tion onto the meaning of “radio communication” under 
the Wiretap Act in holding that the term encompasses 
only “predominantly auditory broadcasts.”  That inter-
pretation defies established federal law, renders ele-
ments of the Wiretap Act incoherent, muddies the rela-
tionship between the Wiretap Act and the Communica-
tions Act, and improperly narrows the scope of the 
Act’s exemptive provisions.    
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is not only 
wrong, it is also at odds with the reality of modern 
technologies, which erase any plausible line between 
“auditory” and “non-auditory” transmissions.  A packet 
of data delivering voice is indistinguishable as it travels 
over radio waves from a packet of data delivering text.  
The court of appeals’ opinion staked its definition of 
“radio communication” on a distinction that is entirely 
illusory.  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals initially issued an opinion on Septem-
ber 10, 2013.  App. 31a-64a.  Following Google’s petition for rehear-
ing, the panel amended its original opinion on December 27, 2013 
by deleting its discussion of an additional issue.  App. 1a-30a.  It is 
the amended opinion that is the subject of this petition. 
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creates significant ambiguity in an area of law where 
there is a need for clarity.  Indeed,  the court of appeals 
itself acknowledged that it was unsure how its novel 
interpretation applies to the billions of cell phone calls 
made in the United States each day.    
The ruling creates substantial uncertainty regard-
ing the scope of civil and criminal liability under the 
Wiretap Act—uncertainty that is particularly troubling 
given the ubiquity of modern information technologies, 
such as Wi-Fi, that involve the transmission of digital 
information by radio, and the potential for sizeable 
statutory damage awards under the Act.  In light of all 
these considerations, the Court should grant the peti-
tion and resolve the important question of federal stat-
utory construction that this case presents. 
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S NOVEL GLOSS ON “RADIO 
COMMUNICATION” CONFLICTS WITH THE TERM’S 
LONG-ESTABLISHED MEANING AND WITH THE WIRE-
TAP ACT’S TEXT AND PURPOSE 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation Is Incon-
sistent With The Established Meaning Of 
“Radio Communication” In The Telecommu-
nications Field And Under Federal Law 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “radio com-
munication” as limited to “predominantly auditory 
broadcasts” fails to give that term its established and 
accepted meaning under federal law.  When Congress 
added “radio communication” to the Wiretap Act in 
1986, the term had been defined for decades in related 
statutes.  The Communications Act of 1934 expressly 
defined “radio communication” as “the transmission by 
radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of 
all kinds.”  Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1065 
(1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(4)).  And even before, 
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the Radio Act of 1927 had defined the term as “any in-
telligence, message, signal, power, pictures, or commu-
nication of any nature transferred by electrical energy 
from one point to another without the aid of any wire 
connecting the points from and at which the electrical 
energy is sent or received and any system by means of 
which such transfer of energy is effected.”  Pub. L. No. 
69-632, § 31, 44 Stat. 1162, 1173 (1927).  Absent any in-
dication to the contrary, the term “radio communica-
tion” should be read consistently across the Wiretap 
Act and these related statutes.  See, e.g., Northcross v. 
Memphis Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per 
curiam) (“The similarity of language in [two statutes] 
is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes 
should be interpreted pari passu.”); Gozlon-Peretz v. 
United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407-408 (1991) (when con-
struing “specialized statutory terms,” courts “refer to 
other, related legislative enactments”). 
Congress intended the Communications Act and 
the Wiretap Act to be construed in tandem.  The two 
statutes expressly cross-reference each other.  See 47 
U.S.C. § 605(a) (Communications Act referencing Wire-
tap Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iii) (Wiretap Act refer-
encing Communications Act).  And various provisions 
of the two statutes address the same subject matter, 
including provisions prohibiting interception that Con-
gress intended to be read together.  See Edwards v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Wiretap Act limits the scope of § 605 of the Communi-
cations Act because “Congress likely intended to make 
the statutes consistent”); United States v. Rose, 669 
F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1982) (“When Congress passed [the 
Wiretap Act] …, it simultaneously amended § 605 to 
state that § 605 does not apply to communications that 
may be intercepted and disclosed under [the Wiretap 
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Act] by prefacing § 605’s prohibition against disclosure 
with the words ‘(e)xcept as authorized by (Title III).’” 
(alterations in original)).  There is no plausible basis to 
construe the term “radio communication” differently 
across two statutes so closely intertwined.  See 
Kozoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).   
Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals did 
here.  It gave the term “radio communication” in the 
Wiretap Act an entirely different meaning than it has 
in the Communications Act.  That result is particularly 
confounding because the Ninth Circuit’s counter-
textual definition diverges from the established mean-
ing of “radio communication” in the telecommunications 
field.  “Radio communication” is generally understood 
to mean “any communication using radio waves.”  
Meadows et al., Dictionary of New Information Tech-
nology 151 (1982) (emphasis added).  “Radio communi-
cation” has long been understood to encompass trans-
missions of all kinds—auditory, visual, and otherwise—
over radio waves.  Indeed, an electronics dictionary 
from the 1940s defined the term (consistent with the 
Communications Act) as “[t]he transmission by radio of 
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all 
kinds.”  Cooke & Markus, Electronics Dictionary 303 
(1st ed. 1945); see also Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 
948 (26th ed. 2011) (defining “radio communication” as 
“[a]ny telecommunication by means of radio waves”). 
The FCC’s longstanding definition of “radio com-
munication” also clearly encompasses non-auditory ra-
dio transmissions.  Under FCC rules, “radiocommuni-
cations” are all “[t]elecommunication[s] by means of ra-
dio waves.”  47 C.F.R. § 2.1; see also In re Petition by 
Hawaiian Tel. Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 308, 310 (1969) (“A [tel-
evision] broadcast signal is a radio communication.”).  
Not surprisingly, therefore, the FCC’s review of 
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Google’s Street View activities never contemplated 
that “radio communication” under the Wiretap Act 
would not encompass Wi-Fi transmissions.  See In the 
Matter of Google, Inc., 27 FCC Rcd 4012, 4033-4034 
¶¶ 51-53 (2012). 
The Ninth Circuit ignored all of this authority.  In-
stead, it gave “radio communication” a new definition 
based on the panel’s unsupported beliefs about the 
term’s “ordinary meaning.”  Yet not only is the panel’s 
definition contrary to every dictionary and supported by 
no other authorities, it also defies the way the term “ra-
dio” is actually used in common parlance, where it has 
never been limited to technologies that are predomi-
nantly auditory.  For example, “packet radio” involves 
“the transmission of data over radio.”  Newton’s Telecom 
Dictionary 856.  And Radio Frequency Identity (RFID) 
technology, which uses radio waves to send data rather 
than sound, has everyday applications that range from 
identifying livestock, to paying highway tolls with E-
ZPass, to tracking retail inventory.  Id. at 979. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation Is Contra-
dicted By The Text And Structure Of The 
Wiretap Act 
The Ninth Circuit’s definition of “radio communica-
tion” is contrary not only to the term’s established 
meaning, but also to the text and structure of the Wire-
tap Act itself. 
1. “Radio communication” in the Wiretap 
Act encompasses transmissions that are 
not “predominantly auditory” 
The Wiretap Act identifies as “radio communica-
tions” a number of transmissions that are not “predom-
inantly auditory broadcasts.”  The Ninth Circuit’s re-
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strictive definition, accordingly, cannot be squared with 
the Act’s plain text. 
Section 2510(16) lists several kinds of “radio com-
munications” that contain substantial non-auditory con-
tent, such as text and pictures.  For example, communi-
cations “carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidi-
ary to a radio transmission,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(C), 
include “data carried on the Vertical Blanking Interval 
(VBI) of a television signal,” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 15 
(1986).  VBI communication is not predominantly audi-
tory—it includes “textual and graphic information in-
tended for display on viewing screens.”  In re Amend-
ment of Parts 2, 73, & 76, 101 F.C.C.2d 973, 973-974 ¶2 
(1985).  Yet the Act identifies VBI communication as 
“radio communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(C).  Simi-
larly, the Act forbids the interception of visual display 
pagers, “which involve the transmission of alphanumer-
ic characters over the radio,” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 15, 
because they are a form of “radio communication” “car-
ried by a common carrier,” id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(D). 
Moreover, none of the “radio communications” 
transmitted on radio frequencies “allocated under part 
25 and subparts D … or F of part 74” of the FCC’s rules, 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(E), are restricted to “predominant-
ly auditory broadcasts.”  Those “radio communications” 
cover satellite broadcasts, including satellite television.  
47 C.F.R. §§ 25.101-25.701.  They also include Remote 
Pickup Broadcast Stations for “AM, FM, … [and] TV … 
station[s],” id. §§ 74.431, 74.432, which are used “for the 
transmission of material from the scene of events which 
occur outside the studio back to studio or production 
center,” id. § 74.432(a).  See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 38 
(1986) (the specified subparts of Part 74 include “video 
and audio transmissions from a news team in the field to 
the studio, and transmission from the studio to the 
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transmitter site”).  And they include  frequencies that 
are reserved for television broadcast auxiliary stations, 
and are used for the “transmission of TV program ma-
terial and related communication.”  47 C.F.R. §§ 74.600, 
74.601.  Nor are the “radio communications” described 
in § 2511(2)(g)(ii) limited to “predominantly auditory 
broadcasts.”  In particular,  “radio communication which 
is transmitted by any station for the use of the general 
public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I), includes “television 
broadcast signals,” H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 42 n.86—a 
type of transmission that, of course, is not “predomi-
nantly auditory.”   
In short, the following non-auditory communica-
tions are clearly “radio communications” under the 
Wiretap Act: 
• Display paging systems 
• Data carried on the VBI of a television signal 
• Television broadcasts 
• Satellite transmissions (including satellite TV) 
• Video transmissions from field reporters 
These examples unmistakably demonstrate that 
the Wiretap Act itself does not limit the term “radio 
communication” to “predominantly auditory” transmis-
sions.  It is thus unsurprising that there is no support in 
the case law or any other authority for the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s restrictive definition.  
These provisions also reveal the incongruity of con-
struing “communication by radio” differently from “ra-
dio communication,” as the Ninth Circuit did.  App. 16a-
18a.  For one, the two terms are just different formula-
tions of the same words.  Just as “travel by train” 
means the same thing as “train travel,” “radio commu-
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nication” and “communication by radio” are synony-
mous.  The Ninth Circuit’s claim that “communication 
by radio” is “used more expansively” to include “all 
communications using radio waves,” while “radio com-
munication” “refer[s] more narrowly to broadcast radio 
technologies” is baseless.  App. 16a-17a.  The term “ra-
dio communication” as used in the Act encompasses far 
more than “auditory broadcasts,” as the provisions de-
scribed above illustrate; the fact that “communication 
by radio” also encompasses non-auditory transmissions 
simply confirms the scope of both terms. 
2. A central element of the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning—that “radio communication” 
does not encompass television—is plain-
ly wrong under established telecommu-
nications law 
A central premise of the court of appeals’ restric-
tive definition was that “[o]ne would not ordinarily con-
sider, say, television a form of “‘radio communication.’”  
App. 12a.  This further exposes the court’s error, how-
ever, as it is clear from the Wiretap Act’s text and leg-
islative history that “radio communication” does en-
compass both broadcast and satellite television. 
As explained above, at p. 14, subpart (E) of 
§ 2510(16) categorizes transmissions over the radio fre-
quencies allocated under part 25 of the FCC Rules as 
radio communications.  Those frequencies are reserved 
for satellite communications, including satellite televi-
sion.  47 C.F.R. §§ 25.101-25.701; see United States v. 
Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing sat-
ellite television transmissions as “radio communica-
tions”).  Moreover, it is clear that § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)’s ref-
erence to any “radio communication which is transmit-
ted by any station for the use of the general public” was 
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intended to include broadcast television.  See H.R. Rep. 
No. 99-647, at 42 n.86 (“television broadcast signals”). 
Other federal courts have consistently classified 
television as a form of “radio communication.”  See, e.g., 
DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(satellite television “is a radio communication service”); 
Shriver, 989 F.2d at 902; Winchester TV Cable Co. v. 
FCC, 462 F.2d 115, 118 n.9 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Radio 
communication, of course, includes television.”).  The 
FCC has long held the same position.  See In re Peti-
tion by Hawaiian Tel. Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 308, 310, ¶ 9 
(1969) (“A [television] broadcast signal is a radio com-
munication[.]”).  
The Ninth Circuit nevertheless based its analysis 
on the erroneous belief (at App. 12a) that Congress does 
not “assume[] that the term ‘radio’ encompasses the 
term ‘television.’”  To support this conclusion, the court 
identified other statutes in which Congress referred to 
both “radio” and “television”—an observation that has 
no bearing on whether “radio communication” as used in 
the Wiretap Act encompasses television transmissions.  
App. 12a-13a.  In any event, the other statutes cited by 
the Ninth Circuit use the word “radio” but do not even 
contain the term “radio communication,” and they are 
not telecommunications statutes at all.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§§1343 (criminal mail fraud), 2101 (criminal incitement 
of a riot); 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (animal fighting).  The far 
more apt comparison is to the Communications Act, 
which operates in tandem with the Wiretap Act, and 
unquestionably includes television in the definition of 
“radio communication.”  See infra pp. 10-12. 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “radio 
communication” is unprecedented, at odds with the 
statutory text and legislative history, and conflicts with 
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established interpretations of the term under federal 
law, as recognized by other courts and by the FCC.  
The Court should grant review to resolve the funda-
mental question the court of appeals’ decision raises 
about the scope of the Wiretap Act. 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION FAILS TO ACCOUNT 
FOR MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
WILL HAVE WIDE-RANGING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding is not merely wrong.  It 
is technologically unsound and creates serious practical 
problems in applying the Wiretap Act.  Certiorari is 
warranted to restore coherence to this significant fed-
eral statute. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Definition Draws A Line 
Between “Auditory” And “Non-Auditory” 
Transmissions That Has Become Meaningless 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “radio com-
munication” rests on a distinction between “auditory” 
and “non-auditory” transmissions that has effectively 
disappeared with the evolution of modern communica-
tions technology.  As a result, the court’s decision 
threatens incoherence in the application of the Wiretap 
Act to the information technology industry. 
While analog telephone lines or CB radios once car-
ried “voice” or “auditory” transmissions distinct from 
other forms of transmission, that is no longer the case.  
Today, many voice calls are transmitted in packets of 
data using the “voice over Internet protocol” (VoIP), 
not only through services such as Skype and Vonage 
but even by primary telephone and cable providers.  
See, e.g., United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 
701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Many phone calls today are 
made by digitizing speech and transferring the result 
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by packet switching.”); Nagesh, FCC to Vote on Scrap-
ping Telecom Landlines, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 2014, at 
B3 (“VoIP is already offered by a number of phone and 
cable companies” and carriers such as AT&T and Veri-
zon “want to retire their existing, circuit-switched sys-
tems and move to systems based on Internet protocol—
essentially treating phone calls like other data moving 
over the Internet.”). 
Other technologies have further blurred any “audi-
tory”-“non-auditory” line.  Text messages can be sent 
as voice messages that travel the Internet (and the 
airwaves) just like any other form of data.  And tech-
nologies such as Apple’s Siri or Google’s Voice Search 
allow users to “speak” to a computer system over the 
Internet—to ask directions or to search the web—and 
provide for the system to “speak” back.  See Apple Inc. 
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“Advertised by Apple as an ‘intelligent personal 
assistant,’ Siri enables iPhone 4S users to speak their 
commands to the phone in a natural and conversational 
tone. …  [C]onsumers often use Siri in ways that in-
clude looking for information.”). 
In the world of Internet protocol communications, a 
bit of data is simply a bit of data.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision offers no intelligible rationale for distinguish-
ing “auditory” bits from “non-auditory” ones. 
B. The Decision Below Creates Significant Un-
certainty Regarding The Scope Of The Wire-
tap Act 
Even as to more established technologies, the 
Ninth Circuit’s restrictive definition of “radio commu-
nication” introduces significant uncertainty in the ap-
plication of the Wiretap Act.  Indeed, the court of ap-
peals’ decision calls into question how the Act applies to 
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basic modern technologies such as television and cell 
phone communications. 
Consider the acquisition of television broadcast 
signals—watching TV—which, absent some exception, 
the Wiretap Act would prohibit.  Television constitutes 
“wire communication” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (18), 
because it often contains “the human voice” and is gen-
erally transmitted “by the aid of wire, cable, or other 
like connection,” such as a cable television system.  As 
such, it does not qualify for the exception in 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) for electronic communications that are 
“readily accessible to the general public” because wire 
communications are specifically excluded from the defi-
nition of electronic communications.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(12)(A).  Congress evidently intended 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)—covering any “radio communication 
which is transmitted by any station for the use of the 
general public”—to shield television from the prohibi-
tion on interception of electronic communications.  H.R. 
Rep. No. 99-647, at 42 n.86.  But under the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation, that exception would not apply 
because in its view “radio communication” does not en-
compass television.  Surely Congress did not intend to 
criminalize watching television.  The fact that the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion, taken to its logical conclusion, sug-
gests otherwise highlights the error of the court’s in-
terpretation and the mischief it may cause. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s definition creates 
doubt as to whether intercepting transmissions from 
“public safety communications systems” and “marine or 
aeronautical communications systems” would be pro-
tected from liability under § 2511(2)(g)(ii), as Congress 
intended, if such transmissions contained non-auditory 
information.  Increasingly, such transmissions do con-
tain non-auditory information—they contain data.  See, 
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e.g.,  National Telecommunications & Information Ad-
ministration, About FirstNet, available at http://www.
ntia.doc.gov/page/about-firstnet (last visited Mar. 27, 
2014) (describing broadband data network for first re-
sponders). 
Perhaps even more remarkably, the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion calls into question whether ordinary cell phone 
calls are protected from interception under the Wiretap 
Act.  The opinion itself acknowledges that, under its 
reading of the law, whether cell phone calls satisfy the 
“broadcast” portion of its “predominantly audio broad-
cast” test and thus qualify as radio communications is a 
“close question.”  App. 15a.  That acknowledgment 
leaves the tens of millions of cell phone users in the 
Ninth Circuit uncertain about whether their calls can 
lawfully be intercepted—and highlights the error of the 
court’s interpretation.  It is clear from the Act’s legisla-
tive history that Congress viewed cell phone communi-
cations as “radio communications” and intended the 
“common carrier” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(D) 
to protect cell phone communications from interception.  
See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 32 (“Because cellular 
communication is transmitted over a communication 
system currently regarded by the FCC as a common 
carrier, the Committee also intends that such commu-
nication not be considered ‘readily accessible to the 
general public’ at any time subsequent to the date of 
enactment, regardless of how a provider of cellular ser-
vice is denominated by any state or how the FCC may 
classify any such provider in the future.” (footnote 
omitted)).  By leaving open whether cell phone trans-
missions are “radio communications,” the Ninth Circuit 
has created ambiguity in an area where Congress in-
tended certainty. 
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In short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is out of step 
with modern technology and introduces significant am-
biguities in the application of the Wiretap Act, creating 
uncertainty about how the Act applies even to every-
day technological activities.3 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Casts Doubt On 
The Legality Of Standard Security Procedures 
In The Information Technology Industry 
Review is also warranted because the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision potentially renders unlawful—and sub-
jects to possible criminal liability—security procedures 
that are standard in the information technology (IT) 
industry.  IT professionals routinely use the same kind 
of technology as Google’s Street View cars did to collect  
packet data in order to secure company networks.  And 
unlike Google, which never used the payload data it col-
lected, security professionals also parse and analyze the 
data collected from wired and wireless networks, in-
cluding networks operated by other persons or entities, 
to identify vulnerabilities in and potential attacks on 
the networks they protect.  See generally Mateti, 
Hacking Techniques in Wireless Networks, in 3 Hand-
book of Information Security 83, 83-93 (Hossein Bidgoli 
ed., 2006).  For example, IT security experts use packet 
analysis to monitor wireless traffic in order to create a 
list of all access points in use.  This allows them to de-
tect unauthorized or rogue Wi-Fi access points in the 
                                                 
3 Because the Wiretap Act is a criminal statute, the rule of 
lenity required the court to resolve any ambiguity in Petitioner’s 
favor and to adopt the established definition of “radio communica-
tion.”  See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Because 
we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter 
its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of leni-
ty applies.”).  But far from resolving any ambiguity in the Act, the 
court of appeals’ decision compounded it. 
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network—i.e., unapproved Wi-Fi networks that may be 
set up by employees to circumvent network security or 
by attackers to infiltrate the company’s network.  See, 
e.g., Beyah & Venkataraman, Rogue-Access-Point De-
tection: Challenges, Solutions, and Future Directions, 
IEEE 56-57 (Sept./Oct. 2011).   
These types of security measures are critical.  
Networks that connect company computers to each 
other and to the Internet are vulnerable to hacking and 
other security breaches, even when they are properly 
encrypted.  See generally Mateti, supra, at 83-90.  
Moreover, federal statutes and regulations require cer-
tain entities, such as healthcare providers and financial 
institutions, to meet network security standards.  See 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (information security for health in-
formation); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306, 164.308, 164.312 (asso-
ciated regulations); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6801 (information security for financial institutions); 
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for 
Safeguarding Customer Information and Rescission of 
Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, 66 
Fed. Reg. 8616 (Feb. 1, 2001) (associated regulations). 
Packet analysis can also help to enforce company 
policies prohibiting employees from bringing unauthor-
ized wireless devices to worksites by tracking the ad-
dresses of all Wi-Fi devices using the network.  And it 
can be used to optimize network performance by, for 
example, analyzing traffic to determine how to decrease 
packet loss.  See, e.g., Nisar et al., 2010 International 
Symposium, Enhanced Performance of Packet Trans-
mission Using System Model Over VoIP Network, In-
formation Technology (ITSim) 1005-1008 (June 2010). 
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Each of these legitimate uses of packet analysis 
technology could result in the acquisition of payload da-
ta from nearby unencrypted Wi-Fi networks.  The 
technology does not distinguish between company sig-
nals and external signals—indeed doing so would defeat 
its security purpose.  Thus, packet analysis will often 
collect data from any open Wi-Fi network within range.  
In densely populated areas, this will likely include indi-
vidual home networks of the sort Respondents claim to 
operate.  Rather than providing a clear definition that 
IT security professionals could rely on, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s definition imperils an important IT security tool. 
D. Whether Unencrypted Wi-Fi Communications 
Are Covered By The Wiretap Act Presents A 
Significant Legal Issue 
Various courts in recent years have confronted the 
application of the Wiretap Act to unencrypted Wi-Fi 
transmissions, and none has adopted the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s erroneous interpretation.  In In re Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 
(N.D. Ill. 2012), a plaintiff in a patent infringement ac-
tion sought an admissibility ruling on its proposed dis-
covery protocol to collect evidence using packet analy-
sis (or “sniffing”) technology.  The court held that the 
proposed protocol would not violate the Wiretap Act 
because “in light of the ease of ‘sniffing’ Wi-Fi networks 
… the communications sent on an unencrypted Wi-Fi 
network are readily accessible to the general public.”  
Id. at 893. 
Similarly, in United States v. Ahrndt, Crim No. 08-
468, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010) rev’d on oth-
er grounds and remanded, 475 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 
2012), the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence 
collected from his shared iTunes library, which the of-
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ficer accessed via defendant’s unsecured Wi-Fi net-
work.  The court rejected the argument that the of-
ficer’s conduct violated the Wiretap Act, holding that 
since defendant’s Wi-Fi network was unencrypted, it 
was “configured so that any electronic communications 
emanating from his computer … were readily accessi-
ble to any member of the general public with a Wi-Fi 
enabled laptop.”  Arndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8. 
Given the ubiquity of Wi-Fi and the availability of 
packet-analysis technology, issues regarding the appli-
cation of the Wiretap Act to Wi-Fi transmissions will 
continue to arise and with increasing frequency.  The 
significance of the issue is all the greater because the 
Wiretap Act provides for statutory damages, in appro-
priate cases, in the amount of the greater of $100 per 
day for each day of violation or $10,000.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2520(c)(B).  Defendants therefore face significant po-
tential damages for conduct that would be innocent ab-
sent the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretation.  This 
Court should intervene now and settle the uncertainty 
regarding the application of the Wiretap Act to Wi-Fi 
transmissions. 
* * * 
The decision below manufactures a definition of 
“radio communication” that is at odds with established 
federal law and with the text, structure, and legislative 
history of the Wiretap Act.  The Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation is based on a purported distinction between 
non-auditory and auditory radio transmissions that is 
illusory in modern communications technologies.  The 
decision thus creates significant complications regard-
ing application of the Wiretap Act to information tech-
nologies and introduces significant legal uncertainty.  
In light of the clear error of the court of appeals’ deci-
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sion, and the decision’s ramifications for the infor-
mation technology industry, the Court should grant re-
view on this important question of federal statutory in-
terpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
granted.  
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
No. 11-17483 
D.C. No. 5:10-md-02184-JW 
 
BENJAMIN JOFFE; LILLA MARIGZA; RICK BENITTI; 
BERTHA DAVIS; JASON TAYLOR; ERIC MYHRE; JOHN E. 
REDSTONE; MATTHEW BERLAGE; PATRICK KEYES; 
KARL H. SCHULZ; JAMES FAIRBANKS; AARON LINSKY; 
DEAN M. BASTILLA; VICKI VAN VALIN; JEFFREY 
COLMAN; RUSSELL CARTER; STEPHANIE CARTER; 
JENNIFER LOCSIN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
GOOGLE, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California 
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding 
 
Argued and Submitted 
June 10, 2013—San Francisco, California 
Filed September 10, 2013 
Amended December 27, 2013 
 
ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION 
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Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit 
Judges, and William H. Stafford, Senior District Judge.* 
Opinion by Judge Bybee 
* * * 
ORDER 
Appellant’s motion for leave to file a reply brief in 
support of its petition for rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, filed on November 6, 2013, is GRANTED. 
Appellant’s petition for rehearing, filed on 
September 24, 2013, is GRANTED IN PART.  The 
court’s opinion, filed on September 10, 2013, and 
appearing at 729 F.3d 1362 (9th Cir. 2013), is hereby 
AMENDED.  An amended opinion is filed concurrently 
with this order. 
Judge Bybee votes to deny Appellant’s petition for 
rehearing en banc, filed on September 24, 2013, and 
Judge Tashima and Judge Stafford so recommend.  The 
full court has been advised of Appellant’s petition for 
rehearing en banc, and no request to vote on whether 
to rehear the case en banc has been made.  Appellant’s 
petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. 
No subsequent petitions for rehearing or rehearing 
en banc shall be filed by either party. 
OPINION 
BYBEE, Circuit Judge: 
In the course of capturing its Street View 
photographs, Google collected data from unencrypted 
                                                 
* The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District 
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida, sitting by designation. 
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Wi-Fi networks.  Google publicly apologized, but 
plaintiffs brought suit under federal and state law, 
including the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511.  Google 
argues that its data collection did not violate the Act 
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an 
“electronic communication” that is “readily accessible 
to the general public” and exempt under the Act.  18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  The district court rejected 
Google’s argument.  In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. 
Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073–84 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011).  We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts and History 
Google launched its Street View feature in the 
United States in 2007 to complement its Google Maps 
service by providing users with panoramic, street-level 
photographs.  Street View photographs are captured 
by cameras mounted on vehicles owned by Google that 
drive on public roads and photograph their 
surroundings.  Between 2007 and 2010, Google also 
equipped its Street View cars with Wi-Fi antennas and 
software that collected data transmitted by Wi-Fi 
networks in nearby homes and businesses.  The 
equipment attached to Google’s Street View cars 
recorded basic information about these Wi-Fi 
networks, including the network’s name (SSID), the 
unique number assigned to the router transmitting the 
wireless signal (MAC address), the signal strength, and 
whether the network was encrypted.  Gathering this 
basic data about the Wi-Fi networks used in homes and 
businesses enables companies such as Google to provide 
enhanced “location-based” services, such as those that 
allow mobile phone users to find nearby restaurants 
and attractions or receive driving directions. 
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But the antennas and software installed in Google’s 
Street View cars collected more than just the basic 
identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks.  
They also gathered and stored “payload data” that was 
sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections 
at the moment that a Street View car was driving by.1  
Payload data includes everything transmitted by a 
device connected to a Wi-Fi network, such as personal 
emails, usernames, passwords, videos, and documents. 
Google acknowledged in May 2010 that its Street 
View vehicles had been collecting fragments of payload 
data from unencrypted Wi-Fi networks.  The company 
publicly apologized, grounded its vehicles, and 
rendered inaccessible the personal data that had been 
acquired.  In total, Google’s Street View cars collected 
about 600 gigabytes of data transmitted over Wi-Fi 
networks in more than 30 countries. 
Several putative class-action lawsuits were filed 
shortly after Google’s announcement, and, in August 
2010, the cases were transferred by the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation to the Northern District of 
California.  In November, 2010, Plaintiffs-Appellees 
(collectively “Joffe”) filed a consolidated complaint, 
asserting claims against Google under the federal 
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511; California Business and 
Professional Code § 17200; and various state wiretap 
statutes.  Joffe seeks to represent a class comprised of 
all persons whose electronic communications were 
intercepted by Google Street View vehicles since May 
25, 2007.   
                                                 
1 Google may have also used its software to capture 
encrypted data, but the plaintiffs have conceded that their 
wireless networks were unencrypted. 
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Google moved to dismiss Joffe’s consolidated 
complaint.  The district court declined to grant Google’s 
motion to dismiss Joffe’s federal Wiretap Act claims.2  
In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1084.  On Google’s request, the court 
certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) because the district court resolved a 
novel question of statutory interpretation.  We granted 
Google’s petition, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
B. District Court’s Decision 
Google maintained before the district court that it 
should have dismissed Joffe’s Wiretap Act claims 
because data transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi 
networks falls under the statutory exemption that 
makes it lawful to intercept “electronic 
communications” that are “readily accessible tothe 
general public.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  The question 
was whether payload data transmitted on an 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is “readily accessible to the 
general public,” such that the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption 
applies to Google’s conduct. 
To answer this question, the district court first 
looked to the definitions supplied by the Act.  In re 
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 
2d at 1075–76.  The statute provides in relevant part 
that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ means, 
with respect to a radio communication, that such 
communication is not … (A) scrambled or encrypted.”  
                                                 
2 The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss Joffe’s 
claims under California law and other state wiretap statutes.  In re 
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 
1085–86.  These claims are not at issue here. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).  An unencrypted radio 
communication is, therefore, “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  In short, intercepting an unencrypted 
radio communication does not give rise to liability 
under the Wiretap Act because of the combination of 
the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption and the § 2510(16) 
definition. 
The district court then considered whether data 
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is a “radio 
communication” because the phrase is not defined by 
the Act.  In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n 
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–81.  The court reasoned 
that “radio communication” encompasses only 
“traditional radio services,” and not other technologies 
that also transmit data using radio waves, such as 
cellular phones and Wi-Fi networks.3  Id. at 1079–83.  
Since Wi-Fi networks are not a “radio communication,” 
the definition of “readily accessible to the general 
public” provided by § 2510(16) does not apply because 
the definition is expressly limited to electronic 
communications that are radio communications. 
Finally, the court addressed whether data 
transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is 
nevertheless an “electronic communication” that is 
“readily accessible to the general public” under 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  Id. at 1082–84.  Although the court 
determined that Wi-Fi networks do not involve a “radio 
communication” under § 2510(16) and are therefore not 
“readily accessible to the general public” by virtue of 
the definition of the phrase, it still had to resolve 
whether they are “readily accessible to the general 
                                                 
3 It is less clear whether the district court’s definition also 
excludes television broadcasts.  Joffe argued at oral argument that 
television broadcasts are “traditional radio services.” 
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public” as the phrase is ordinarily understood because 
the statute does not define the phrase as it applies to an 
“electronic communication” that is not a “radio 
communication.”  The court reasoned that “without 
more, merely pleading that a network is unencrypted 
does not render that network readily accessible to the 
general public and serve to remove the intentional 
interception of electronic communications from that 
network from liability under the [Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act].”  Id. at 1084.  The court 
accordingly declined to grant Google’s motion to 
dismiss Joffe’s Wiretap Act claims.  Id. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WIRETAP ACT 
The Wiretap Act imposes liability on a person who 
“intentionally intercepts … any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), subject to a 
number of exemptions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)–(h).  
There are two exemptions that are relevant to our 
purposes.  First, the Wiretap Act exempts intercepting 
“an electronic communication made through an 
electronic communication system” if the system is 
configured so that it is “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  “Electronic 
communication” includes communication by radio, 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(12), and “‘readily accessible to the 
general public’ means, with respect to a radio 
communication” that the communication is “not … 
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).  
Second, the Act exempts intercepting “radio 
communication” by “any station for the use of the 
general public;” by certain governmental 
communication systems “readily accessible to the 
general public,” including police, fire, and civil defense 
agencies; by a station operating on an authorized 
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frequency for “amateur, citizens band, or general 
mobile radio services;” or by a marine or aeronautical 
communications system.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)–
(IV). 
Google only argues, as it did before the district 
court, that it is exempt from liability under the Act 
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an 
“electronic communication … readily accessible to the 
general public” under § 2511(2)(g)(i).  It concedes that it 
does not qualify for any of the exemptions for specific 
types of “radio communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii).  
Joffe, however, argues that if data transmitted over a 
Wi-Fi network is not exempt as a “radio 
communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii), it cannot be 
exempt as a radio communication under the broader 
exemption for “electronic communication” in 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  This argument has some force, and we 
wish to address it before we consider Google’s claims. 
Joffe contends that the definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” in § 2510(16) does not 
apply to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption.  Instead, Joffe 
argues, the § 2510(16) definition applies exclusively to 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), which exempts specifically 
enumerated types of “radio communication” when they 
are “readily accessible to the general public.”  We 
ultimately reject Joffe’s alternative reading of the 
statute, although—as we will explain—we find 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) useful as a lexigraphical aid to 
understanding the phrase “radio communication.” 
As noted, § 2510(16) defines “readily accessible to 
the general public” solely with respect to a “radio 
communication,” and not with respect to other types of 
“electronic communication.”  Although § 2511(2)(g)(i) 
does not use the words “radio communication,” the 
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statute nevertheless directs us to apply the § 2510(16) 
definition to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption.  First, “radio 
communication” is a subset of “electronic 
communication.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (providing 
that, subject to certain exceptions, “‘electronic 
communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system”) (emphasis added).  Second, the statute directs 
us to apply § 2510(16) to the entire chapter.  The 
definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 are prefaced with the 
phrase, “As used in this chapter.”  We cannot disregard 
this command by holding that the definition of “‘readily 
accessible to the general public’ [ ] with respect to a 
radio communication” applies to § 2511(2)(g)(ii), but not 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
Admittedly, following the plain language of the 
statute creates some tension with § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), 
which provides an exemption for intercepting “any 
radio communication which is transmitted … by any 
governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private 
land mobile, or public communications system, 
including police and fire, readily accessible to the 
general public.”  Under our reading of the statute—
which is the same reading adopted by the district court, 
Google, and Joffe in his lead argument—§ 2511(2)(g)(i) 
exempts all electronic communications (including radio 
communications) that are “readily accessible to the 
general public” as the phrase is defined in § 2510(16).  
This reading likely renders § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) 
superfluous.  As discussed, that section exempts 
specific kinds of radio communications that are “readily 
accessible to the general public,” such as those 
transmitted by a law enforcement communications 
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system.  But this exemption is unnecessary when 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) already exempts all radio 
communications that are “readily accessible to the 
general public.” 
Although our reading may render 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) superfluous or at least redundant, we 
understand that Congress “sometimes drafts provisions 
that appear duplicative of others—simply in Macbeth’s 
words, ‘to make assurance double sure.’  That is, 
Congress means to clarify what might be doubtful—
that the mentioned item is covered.”  Shook v. D.C. 
Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 
F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  This interpretation is 
especially plausible given that Congress was concerned 
that radio hobbyists not face liability for intercepting 
readily accessible broadcasts, such as those covered by 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), which can be picked up by a police 
scanner.  See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04 (1986) (“In order 
to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, we modified the 
original language of S. 1667 to clarify that intercepting 
traditional radio services is not unlawful.”). 
In short, we agree with Google that the definition 
of “readily accessible to the general public” in 
§ 2510(16) applies to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption when 
the communication in question is a “radio 
communication.”  With that understanding, we now 
turn to whether data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network 
is a “radio communication” exempt from the Wiretap 
Act as an “electronic communication” under 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Google contends that data transmitted over a Wi-
Fi network is a “radio communication” and that the Act 
exempts such communications by defining them as 
11a 
 
“readily accessible to the general public,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), so long as “such communication is not … 
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).  We 
reject this claim.4  We hold that the phrase “radio 
communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) excludes 
payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.  As a 
consequence, the definition of “readily accessible to the 
general public [ ] with respect to a radio 
communication” set forth in § 2510(16) does not apply to 
the exemption for an “electronic communication” that is 
“readily accessible to the general public” under 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). 
A. The Ordinary Meaning of “Radio Communication” 
Does Not Include Data Transmitted over a Wi-Fi 
Network 
The Wiretap Act does not define the phrase “radio 
communication” so we must give the term its ordinary 
meaning.  See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 
2471 (2010) (“When terms used in a statute are 
undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”); 
United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“If the statute uses a term which it does not 
define, the court gives that term its ordinary 
meaning.”). 
                                                 
4 This case raises a question of statutory interpretation, 
which we review de novo.  Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 
F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010).  We begin by “determin[ing] 
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”  
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).  We must 
assume that “the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose [of Congress].”  Park ’N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). 
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According to Google, radio communication “refers 
to any information transmitted using radio waves, i.e., 
the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.”  Appellant’s Br. at 28.  The radio frequency 
portion of the spectrum is “the part of the spectrum 
where electromagnetic waves have frequencies in the 
range of about 3 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz.”  Id. at 27. 
Google’s technical definition does not conform with 
the common understanding held contemporaneous with 
the enacting Congress.  See United States v. Iverson, 
162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When a statute 
does not define a term, we generally interpret that 
term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and 
common meaning of the words that Congress used”) 
(emphasis added).  The radio frequency portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum covers not only Wi-Fi 
transmissions, but also television broadcasts, Bluetooth 
devices, cordless and cellular phones, garage door 
openers, avalanche beacons, and wildlife tracking 
collars.  See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Encyclopedia – 
FM Broadcast Station Classes and Service Countours, 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
2003-allochrt.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).  One 
would not ordinarily consider, say, television a form of 
“radio communication.”  Not surprisingly, Congress has 
not typically assumed that the term “radio” 
encompasses the term “television.”  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343 (imposing liability for “[f]raud by wire, radio, or 
television”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 2101 
(imposing liability for inciting a riot by means of “mail, 
telegraph, radio, or television”) (emphasis added); 7 
U.S.C. § 2156 (defining an “instrumentality of 
interstate commerce” as “any written, wire, radio, 
television or other form of communication); see also 
FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 
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815 (1978) (noting that “radio and television stations 
are given different weight,” under the regulations at 
issue, and describing regulations governing “a radio or 
television broadcast station”) (emphasis added). 
The Wiretap Act itself does not assume that the 
phrase “radio communication” encompasses 
technologies like satellite television that are outside the 
scope of the phrase as it is ordinarily defined.  For 
example, the statute’s damages provision sets out 
specified penalties when the “violation of this chapter is 
the private viewing of a private satellite video 
communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if 
the communication is a radio communication that is 
transmitted on [frequencies specified by regulation].”  
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (emphasis added).  Congress 
described separately the act of “viewing [ ] a private 
satellite video communication” even though such 
communication is transmitted on a radio frequency and 
would fall within Google’s proposed definition of “radio 
communication.”  Taken together, these disparate 
provisions offer evidence that Congress does not use 
“radio” or “radio communication” to reference all of the 
myriad forms of communication that use the radio 
spectrum.  Rather, it uses “radio” to refer to traditional 
radio technologies, and then separately describes other 
modes of communication that are not ordinarily thought 
of as radio, but that nevertheless use the radio 
spectrum. 
Google’s proposed definition is in tension with how 
Congress—and virtually everyone else—uses the 
phrase.  In common parlance, watching a television 
show does not entail “radio communication.”  Nor does 
sending an email or viewing a bank statement while 
connected to a Wi-Fi network.  There is no indication 
that the Wiretap Act carries a buried implication that 
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the phrase ought to be given a broader definition than 
the one that is commonly understood.  See Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2012) 
(favoring a definition that matches “how we use the 
word in everyday parlance” and observing that 
“Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a 
broader or different meaning.  But before we will 
assume it has done so, there must be some indication 
Congress intended such a result”). 
Importantly, Congress provided definitions for 
many other similar terms in the Wiretap Act, but 
refrained from providing a technical definition of “radio 
communication” that would have altered the notion that 
it should carry its common, ordinary meaning.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (defining “wire communication”); 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic 
communication”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining 
“electronic communication service”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(17) (defining “electronic storage”).  As Google 
writes in its brief, “[t]he fact that the Wiretap Act 
provides specialized definitions for certain compound 
terms—but not for ‘radio communication’—is powerful 
evidence that the undefined term was not similarly 
intended [to] be defined in a specialized or narrow way” 
but rather “according to its ordinary meaning.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 29.  We agree and, accordingly, we 
reject Google’s proposed definition of “radio 
communication” in favor of one that better reflects the 
phrase’s ordinary meaning. 
B. A “Radio Communication” is a Predominantly 
Auditory Broadcast, Which Excludes Payload 
Data Transmitted over Wi-Fi Networks 
There are two telltale indicia of a “radio 
communication.”  A radio communication is commonly 
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understood to be (1) predominantly auditory, and (2) 
broadcast.  Therefore, television—whether connected 
via an indoor antenna or a satellite dish—is not radio, 
by virtue of its visual component.  A land line phone 
does not broadcast, and, for that reason, is not radio.  
On the other hand, AM/FM, Citizens Band (CB), 
‘walkie-talkie,’ and shortwave transmissions are 
predominantly auditory, are broadcast, and are, not 
coincidentally, typically referred to as “radio” in 
everyday parlance.  Thus, we conclude that “radio 
communication” should carry its ordinary meaning: a 
predominantly auditory broadcast.5 
The payload data transmitted over unencrypted 
Wi-Fi networks that was captured by Google included 
emails, usernames, passwords, images, and documents 
that cannot be classified as predominantly auditory.  
They therefore fall outside of the definition of a “radio 
                                                 
5 We need not reach the question of what exactly constitutes 
a “broadcast” because the Wi-Fi transmissions in question were 
not predominantly auditory.  Whether cell phone calls—which are 
projected wirelessly over great distances—are broadcast would 
similarly be a close question. 
We also need not fully consider the extent to which non-
auditory transmissions may be included in a broadcast before that 
broadcast is no longer a radio broadcast.  Modern FM radio 
stations, for example, commonly transmit small amounts of data 
denoting the artist and title of the song.  But because such data is 
ancillary to the audio transmission, they likely do not remove the 
transmissions from the domain of a “radio communication” under 
the Act. 
And, finally, we do not address how to classify a traditional 
radio broadcast delivered to a web-enabled device connected to a 
Wi-Fi network, such as a radio station streamed over the internet.  
Here, Google’s collection efforts were not limited to auditory 
transmissions. 
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communication” as the phrase is used in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16). 
C. Defining “Radio Communication” to Include Only 
Predominantly Auditory Broadcasts is Consistent 
with the Rest of the Wiretap Act 
Crucially, defining “radio communication” as a 
predominantly auditory broadcast yields a coherent 
and consistent Wiretap Act. Google’s overly broad 
definition does not.  See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain 
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the 
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 
language and design of the statute as a whole.”) 
Throughout the Wiretap Act, Congress used the 
phrase “radio communication”—which is at issue 
here—and the similar phrase “communication by 
radio.”  Even within the very provision that we are 
construing—18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)—Congress used both 
phrases.  We must ascribe to each phrase its own 
meaning.  See SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory 
interpretation that the use of different words or terms 
within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended 
to convey a different meaning for those words.”).  The 
phrase “communication by radio” is used more 
expansively: it conjures an image of all communications 
using radio waves or a radio device.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16)(E) (describing radio communication that “is 
a two-way voice communication by radio transmitted 
on a frequency “not exclusively allocated to broadcast 
auxiliary services.”). 
When read in context, the phrase “radio 
communication” tends to refer more narrowly to 
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broadcast radio technologies rather than to the radio 
waves by which the communication is made.  “Radio 
communication” is typically surrounded by words that 
evoke traditional radio technologies whenever it is used 
in the Act.  See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 
575 (1995) (“‘[A] word is known by the company it 
keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis).  This rule we 
rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so 
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying 
words, thus giving ‘unintended breadth to the Acts of 
Congress.’”).  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii), 
inter alia, exempts from liability the interception of 
“any radio communication which is transmitted … by a 
station operating on an authorized frequency within the 
bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or 
general mobile radio services.”  These are traditional 
audio broadcasts that fit squarely within the ordinary 
meaning of “radio communication.”  The phrase “radio 
communication” is used five times in the Wiretap Act.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii), 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(v), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(i)(B), 18 
U.S.C § 2520(c)(1).  Defining the term as a 
predominantly auditory broadcast would not distort the 
meaning of any of these provisions or otherwise lead to 
incoherence or inconsistency. 
On the other hand, the Wiretap Act uses 
“communication by radio” to refer more broadly to any 
communication transmitted by radio wave.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication” 
to include any communication “transmitted in whole or 
in part by … radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(ii) 
(prohibiting the use of a “device to intercept any oral 
communication” if the “device transmits 
communications by radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b) 
(authorizing FCC employees, in carrying out their 
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official duties, “to intercept … [an] oral communication 
transmitted by radio”).  Congress’s decision to use both 
of these phrases implies that it intended to distinguish 
“radio communication” from “communications by 
radio.”  See McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656.  Ideally, 
Congress would have supplied definitions to make the 
distinction between these terms more apparent.  
Nevertheless, by relying on their ordinary meaning and 
evaluating how they are used in context, we conclude 
that the former refers more narrowly to a 
predominantly auditory broadcast while only the latter 
encompasses other communications made using radio 
waves. 
The way the phrase “radio communication” is used 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) is particularly relevant in 
defining the term because that provision specifically 
exempts from liability the interception of certain kinds 
of radio communication.  The provision is not directly at 
issue here because—as Google acknowledges—Google’s 
conduct is not encompassed by any of the 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) exemptions, hence its reliance on 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  But it is instructive to understand the 
types of communication exempted by § 2511(2)(g)(ii) 
since the phrase “radio communication” is “known by 
the company it keeps,” Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575.  The 
exemptions include, inter alia, radio communications 
transmitted “by any station for the use of the general 
public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I), “by a station 
operating on an authorized frequency within the bands 
allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general 
mobile radio services,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(III), 
and “by any marine or aeronautical communications 
system,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(IV).  Other than the 
fact that they all use the radio spectrum, these radio 
communications have little in common with a home Wi-
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Fi network.  Of course § 2511(2)(g)(i) exempts radio 
communications that are “readily accessible to the 
general public” even if they are not specifically set out 
in § 2511(2)(g)(ii).  But it would be odd for Congress to 
take pains to identify particular kinds of radio 
communications that should be exempt in 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) only to exempt broad swaths of 
dissimilar communications, such as data transmitted 
over a Wi-Fi network, under the auspices of 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  It is more sensible to read the general 
exemption in § 2511(2)(g)(i)—insofar as it applies to 
“radio communication” rather than other kinds of 
“electronic communication”—in light of the specific 
exemptions in § 2511(2)(g)(ii). 
Relatedly, giving “radio communication” its 
ordinary meaning as a predominantly auditory 
broadcast also avoids producing absurd results that are 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  See Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) 
(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce 
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative 
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose 
are available.”); Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schools v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]ell-accepted rules of statutory construction 
caution us that ‘statutory interpretations which would 
produce absurd results are to be avoided.’  When a 
natural reading of the statutes leads to a rational, 
common-sense result, an alteration of meaning is not 
only unnecessary, but also extrajudicial.”).  Under the 
expansive definition of “radio communication” proposed 
by Google, the protections afforded by the Wiretap Act 
to many online communications would turn on whether 
the recipient of those communications decided to secure 
her wireless network.  A “radio communication” is 
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“readily accessible to the general public” and, 
therefore, exempt from Wiretap Act liability if it is not 
scrambled or encrypted.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).  
Consider an email attachment containing sensitive 
personal information sent from a secure Wi-Fi network 
to a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or spouse.  A 
company like Google that intercepts the contents of 
that email from the encrypted home network has, quite 
understandably, violated the Wiretap Act.  But the 
sender of the email is in no position to ensure that the 
recipient—be it a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or 
spouse—has taken care to encrypt her own Wi-Fi 
network.  Google, or anyone else, could park outside of 
the recipient’s home or office with a packet sniffer 
while she downloaded the attachment and intercept its 
contents because the sender’s “radio communication” is 
“readily accessible to the general public” solely by 
virtue of the fact that the recipient’s Wi-Fi network is 
not encrypted.  Surely Congress did not intend to 
condone such an intrusive and unwarranted invasion of 
privacy when it enacted the Wiretap Act “to protect 
against the unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications.”  S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), at 1; see 
also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 
875 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The legislative history of the 
[Wiretap Act] suggests that Congress wanted to 
protect electronic communications that are configured 
to be private, such as email.”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The 
paramount objective of the Wiretap Act is to protect 
effectively the privacy of communications.”). 
The definition of “readily accessible to the general 
public” in § 2510(16) is limited to “radio 
communication,” and does not encompass all “electronic 
communication.”  Congress’s decision to carve out 
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“radio communication” for less protection than some 
other types of “electronic communication” makes sense 
if “radio communication” is given its ordinary meaning.  
Traditional radio services can be easily and mistakenly 
intercepted by hobbyists.  See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04 
(1986) (“In order to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, 
we modified the original language of S. 1667 to clarify 
that intercepting traditional radio services is not 
unlawful.”).  But “radio hobbyists” do not mistakenly 
use packet sniffers to intercept payload data 
transmitted on Wi-Fi networks.  Lending “radio 
communication” a broad definition that encompasses 
data transmitted on Wi-Fi networks would obliterate 
Congress’s compromise and create absurd applications 
of the exemption for intercepting unencrypted radio 
communications.  For example, § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) 
exempts from liability, inter alia, the act of 
intercepting “any radio communication which is 
transmitted … by any governmental, law enforcement 
… or public safety communications system, including 
police and fire, readily accessible to the general public.”  
This provision reinforces the work performed by 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), which already exempts a “radio 
communication” that is “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  Congress’s decision to ensure that 
these communications were exempt makes sense if 
“radio communication” encompasses only 
predominantly auditory broadcasts since these 
transmissions can be picked up by widely available 
police scanners.  But if “radio communication” includes 
data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks, then 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) also underscores that liability should 
not attach to intercepting data from an unencrypted 
Wi-Fi network operated by, say, a police department or 
government agency.  It seems doubtful that Congress 
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wanted to emphasize that Google or anyone else could 
park outside of a police station that carelessly failed to 
secure its Wi-Fi network and intercept confidential 
data with impunity. 
Next, Google strenuously argues that the rest of 
the Wiretap Act supports its position that “radio 
communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) means “any 
information transmitted using radio waves.”  Google 
leans heavily on § 2510(16)(D) and the accompanying 
legislative history, which together suggest that cellular 
telephone and paging systems are a form of “radio 
communication.”  If cell phone and paging systems are 
a type of “radio communication,” Google argues, it must 
be the case that Congress intended that the phrase 
include Wi-Fi networks and the rest of the radio 
spectrum because these technologies differ from 
paradigmatic radio communications like AM/FM, CB, 
and shortwave transmissions.  But cell phone 
communications were not dissimilar from CB, 
shortwave, or other two-way forms of traditional radio 
broadcasts when § 2510(16)(D) was added to the 
Wiretap Act in 1986 as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848.  When Congress enacted § 2510(16)(D), cell 
phones were still called “cellular radiotelephones.”  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (1986).  As with other audio 
broadcasts, cellular conversations were often 
inadvertently picked up by radio hobbyists “scanning 
radio frequencies in order to receive public 
communications.”  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3560 (1986); 
see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (“Cellular 
telephone calls can be intercepted by either 
sophisticated scanners designed for that purpose, or by 
regular radio scanners modified to intercept cellular 
calls”).  The fact that technology has evolved and 
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cellular communications are no longer as similar to CB 
broadcasts as they once were does not require us to 
read “radio communication” to include all 
communications made using radio waves.  Rather, the 
historical context surrounding Congress’s protection of 
cellular conversations as a form of a “radio 
communication” is consistent with the commonsense 
definition of the term because, at the time of the 
enactment of the definition in 1986, cellular 
conversations could have reasonably been construed as 
analogous to a form of two-way radio.6  Assuming, 
arguendo, that the phrase “radio communication” 
covers cell phone transmissions as they existed in 1986 
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that it also 
encompasses transmissions that are plainly not 
predominantly auditory broadcasts, such as payload 
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. 
Google also looks beyond the Wiretap Act in an 
effort to fit its expansive definition of “radio 
communication” into the statutory scheme.  It points 
                                                 
6 With modern advances in cellular technology, it is less clear 
how cell phones would fit within the statutory scheme today.  We 
need not resolve this question here.  Whether cell phone 
transmissions are an example of a “radio communication” is 
relevant to defining the phrase, but it is not a precursor to 
observing that a “radio communication” is ordinarily a 
predominantly auditory broadcast or to holding that payload data 
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio communication.”  
We previously held that cell phone communications are “wire 
communications” for purposes of the Wiretap Act, but we did not 
address whether they are an example of a “radio communication.”  
See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of 
Oral Commc'ns, 349 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Despite 
the apparent wireless nature of cellular phones, communications 
using cellular phones are considered wire communications under 
the statute, because cellular telephones use wire and cable 
connections when connecting calls.”). 
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out that the Communications Act expressly defines the 
phrases “radio communication” and “communication by 
radio” broadly to include “the transmission by radio of 
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all 
kinds.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(40).  But when Congress 
wanted to borrow a definition from the 
Communications Act to apply to the Wiretap Act, it 
expressly said so.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (giving the 
phrase “communication common carrier” the meaning 
that it has “in section 3 of the Communications Act”).  
Here, Congress refrained from incorporating the 
definition of “radio communication” used in the 
Communications Act.  And, as previously discussed, the 
Wiretap Act uses the phrases “radio communication” 
and “communication by radio” differently, indicating 
that Congress did not intend to import the 
Communications Act’s definition, which treats them as 
synonyms.  See 47 U.S.C. § 153(40).  Furthermore, the 
Communication Act’s definition of “radio 
communication” encompasses technologies like 
television by including “the transmission by radio of … 
pictures … of all kinds,” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40), while the 
Wiretap Act sometimes distinguishes them.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (providing specified penalties 
when the “violation of this chapter is the private 
viewing of a private satellite video communication that 
is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication 
is a radio communication that is transmitted on 
[frequencies specified by regulation]”).  Separate 
references to television-related communications would 
be redundant when paired with the phrase “radio 
communication” if we were to assume that the 
Communication Act’s definition applied to the Wiretap 
Act.  Importantly, the presumption that a definition set 
out in one part of the code is intended to govern 
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another is hardly unyielding in the face of such 
contradictory evidence.  See, e.g., General Dynamics 
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004) 
(holding that the word “age” carries a different 
meaning in different sections of the ADEA); Robinson 
v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997) (holding that the 
term “employees” carries a different meaning in 
different sections of Title VII). 
Google also leans heavily on a series of 
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) to argue that 
Congress impliedly gave the phrase “radio 
communication” a meaning other than the ordinary one 
that we adopt here.  In 1990, Senator Patrick Leahy 
commissioned a task force to study the effect of new 
technologies, including the precursors to wireless 
networking, on the statutory scheme created in 1986 by 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.  See S. 
Hrg. 103-1022, at 179 (1994).  In its report, the task 
force indicated it was concerned that communications 
by “‘wireless modems’ which can transmit data 
between computers … will not be protected unless the 
user goes to the expense of full data encryption.”  Id. at 
183.  The section of the report on “Wireless Data 
Communications” concluded that “[t]he task force 
recommends appropriate amendments to legally 
protect digital communications of this type from 
unauthorized interception.”  Id.  In short, the task force 
was of the opinion that the version of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16) enacted in 1986 did not adequately protect 
unencrypted “wireless data communications.”  The task 
force must have implicitly decided that “wireless data 
communications” were a “radio communication” 
because otherwise it would not have been concerned 
with § 2510(16), which only applies to “radio 
communication.”  See id. 
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In 1994, Congress amended § 2510(16) to add a new 
category of communication—which it called an 
“electronic communication”—that it deemed to be a 
“radio communication” that was not “readily accessible 
to the general public.”  In relevant part, the statute 
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ 
means, with respect to a radio communication, that 
such communication is not … (F) an electronic 
communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (1994).  Google 
claims that Congress added § 2510(16)(F) in 1994 in 
order to protect from interception new technologies 
that transmitted data using radio frequencies, including 
the contemporary versions of wireless networks.  
There is some support for this proposition in the 
congressional record.  See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 18 
(1994) (explaining that the bill “[e]xtends privacy 
protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act to cordless phones and certain data 
communications transmitted by radio”). 
The significance of all of this is that Congress 
repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) in 1996.  Google 
attempts to draw a series of inferences from the 1994 
and 1996 amendments:  The 1994 Congress thought 
that data transmissions across the wireless networks of 
the day were a type of “radio communication.”  
Otherwise, Congress would not have needed to amend 
§ 2510(16) in order to shield them from interception 
given that the provision only applies to “radio 
communication.”  By deleting § 2510(16)(F), the 1996 
Congress removed the sole protection for unencrypted 
data transmissions over wireless networks by 
returning § 2510(16) to its pre-amendment form.  From 
Google’s perspective, the upshot of this historical 
narrative is that payload data transmitted over an 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is a “radio communication” 
27a 
 
that is “readily accessible to the general public” before 
the 1994 amendment and, crucially, after the 1996 
repeal. 
This evidence of congressional action and inaction 
is far more equivocal than Google acknowledges.  First, 
the task force’s report does not control what the phrase 
“radio communication” meant to Congress when it 
enacted § 2510(16) in 1986.  The task force’s report 
suggests that it thought that the “wireless data 
communication” technology that existed in 1991 
entailed “radio communication” as the phrase is used in 
§ 2510(16).  But the task force’s opinion on questions of 
statutory interpretation has no independent authority; 
it is not charged with divining congressional intent.  
The task force’s recommendation informs us that in 
1991 a group of fifteen individuals thought that early 
versions of wireless networks involved “radio 
communication” under the statute.  Their opinion is not 
indicative of what Congress intended when it included 
the phrase in the Wiretap Act.  It may be considered 
evidence of the phrase’s ordinary meaning.  But it does 
not outweigh the more substantial evidence, discussed 
at length above, indicating that the ordinary meaning of 
“radio communication” excludes data transmitted over 
a Wi-Fi network. 
Second, Congress’s decision to add § 2510(16)(F) in 
1994 does not prove that it thought data transmitted 
over a Wi-Fi network constituted a “radio 
communication.”  The 1994 Congress was certainly 
concerned about ensuring that “certain data 
communications transmitted by radio” were protected 
from interception.  But that does not necessarily mean 
that it was of the view that such communications were 
a “radio communication” under § 2510(16).  Congress 
might have been forestalling the possibility that 
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evolving technologies would be construed as radio 
communications, contrary to the ordinary meaning of 
the phrase. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is no 
reliable indication of what the 1996 Congress intended 
to accomplish by repealing § 2510(16)(F).  Google mines 
the 1991 task force report and the 1994 congressional 
record, but it cannot close the loop on its argument 
because the 1996 Congress did not leave behind the 
snippets of enactment history that are essential to 
Google’s narrative.  Consider two possible rationales 
for the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F): first, Congress 
might have deleted the provision because it found it 
redundant.  That is, Congress might have thought that 
data transmitted over a radio frequency was not a 
“radio communication,” which would render the 
additional protection for such communications offered 
by § 2510(16)(F) unnecessary. 
Alternatively, Congress might have (correctly) 
determined that § 2510(16)(F) made the statute 
incoherent.  Recall that the short-lived provision 
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ 
means, with respect to a radio communication, that 
such communication is not … (F) an electronic 
communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) (1994).  The 
phrase “electronic communication” has been broadly 
defined since the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986.  In 1994, when § 2510(16)(F) was added, 
the Wiretap Act provided—as it still does today—that 
“‘electronic communication’ means any transfer of 
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in 
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic 
or photooptical system that affects interstate 
commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).  As Google stresses 
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in its briefs, and the statute plainly states, “radio 
communication” is a subset of “electronic 
communication.”  Yet § 2510(16)(F) conveyed that a 
“radio communication” was not “readily accessible to 
the general public” if it was an “electronic 
communication,” which incoherently implies that the 
latter was a subset of the former.  The repeal of 
§ 2510(16)(F) could, therefore, have been a 
housekeeping matter designed to resolve this internal 
tension without affecting the protection afforded 
“electronic communications, including data” that the 
1994 Congress sought to protect. 
Neither of these entirely plausible explanations for 
the amendment and repeal are consistent with Google’s 
assumption that the pre-1994 conception of “radio 
communication” included data transmitted over a Wi-Fi 
network and the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F) sought to 
restore that conception.  The point is that we do not 
know why the 1996 Congress deleted § 2510(16)(F).  
We choose to rely on the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase “radio communication” rather than follow a trail 
of enactment history that culminates in silence and 
then speculate as to Congress’s unexpressed intent. 
Finally, Google’s fall back position is that the rule 
of lenity dictates that we accept its proposed definition 
of “radio communication.”  Although this is a civil suit, 
the Wiretap Act also carries criminal penalties so 
Google’s reliance on the rule of lenity is not unfounded.  
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) 
(“Because we must interpret the statute consistently, 
whether we encounter its application in a criminal or 
noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”).  But 
we do not resort to the rule of lenity every time a 
difficult question of statutory interpretation arises.  
Rather, “the rule of lenity only applies if, after 
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considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there 
remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute.’”  Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 
(2010) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (“The mere possibility 
of articulating a narrower construction [ ] does not 
make the rule of lenity applicable.  Instead, that 
venerable rule is reserved for cases where, ‘[a]fter 
“seizing every thing from which aid can be derived,”’ 
the Court is ‘left with an ambiguous statute.’”) 
(citations omitted).  Here, the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation are sufficient.  The ordinary 
meaning of “radio communication” is consistent with 
the structure of the Act and avoids absurd results 
without running afoul of any clearly expressed 
congressional intent.  We need not resort to the rule of 
lenity where, as here, the ambiguity can be fairly 
resolved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the 
district court that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi 
network is not a “radio communication” under 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(16). 
AFFIRMED. 
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Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit 
Judges, and William H. Stafford, Senior District Judge.* 
Opinion by Judge Bybee 
* * * 
OPINION 
BYBEE, Circuit Judge: 
In the course of capturing its Street View 
photographs, Google collected data from unencrypted 
Wi-Fi networks.  Google publicly apologized, but 
plaintiffs brought suit under federal and state law, 
including the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511.  Google 
argues that its data collection did not violate the Act 
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an 
“electronic communication” that is “readily accessible 
to the general public” and exempt under the Act.  18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  The district court rejected 
Google’s argument.  In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. 
Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073–84 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011).  We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts and History 
Google launched its Street View feature in the 
United States in 2007 to complement its Google Maps 
service by providing users with panoramic, street-level 
photographs.  Street View photographs are captured 
by cameras mounted on vehicles owned by Google that 
drive on public roads and photograph their 
surroundings.  Between 2007 and 2010, Google also 
                                                 
* The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District 
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida, sitting by designation. 
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equipped its Street View cars with Wi-Fi antennas and 
software that collected data transmitted by Wi-Fi 
networks in nearby homes and businesses.  The 
equipment attached to Google’s Street View cars 
recorded basic information about these Wi-Fi 
networks, including the network’s name (SSID), the 
unique number assigned to the router transmitting the 
wireless signal (MAC address), the signal strength, and 
whether the network was encrypted.  Gathering this 
basic data about the Wi-Fi networks used in homes and 
businesses enables companies such as Google to provide 
enhanced “location-based” services, such as those that 
allow mobile phone users to find nearby restaurants 
and attractions or receive driving directions. 
But the antennas and software installed in Google’s 
Street View cars collected more than just the basic 
identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks.  
They also gathered and stored “payload data” that was 
sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections 
at the moment that a Street View car was driving by.1  
Payload data includes everything transmitted by a 
device connected to a Wi-Fi network, such as personal 
emails, usernames, passwords, videos, and documents. 
Google acknowledged in May 2010 that its Street 
View vehicles had been collecting fragments of payload 
data from unencrypted Wi-Fi networks.  The company 
publicly apologized, grounded its vehicles, and 
rendered inaccessible the personal data that had been 
acquired.  In total, Google’s Street View cars collected 
about 600 gigabytes of data transmitted over Wi-Fi 
networks in more than 30 countries. 
                                                 
1 Google may have also used its software to capture 
encrypted data, but the plaintiffs have conceded that their 
wireless networks were unencrypted. 
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Several putative class-action lawsuits were filed 
shortly after Google’s announcement, and, in August 
2010, the cases were transferred by the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation to the Northern District of 
California.  In November, 2010, Plaintiffs-Appellees 
(collectively “Joffe”) filed a consolidated complaint, 
asserting claims against Google under the federal 
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511; California Business and 
Professional Code § 17200; and various state wiretap 
statutes.  Joffe seeks to represent a class comprised of 
all persons whose electronic communications were 
intercepted by Google Street View vehicles since May 
25, 2007. 
Google moved to dismiss Joffe’s consolidated 
complaint.  The district court declined to grant Google’s 
motion to dismiss Joffe’s federal Wiretap Act claims.2  
In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1084.  On Google’s request, the court 
certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) because the district court resolved a 
novel question of statutory interpretation.  We granted 
Google’s petition, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
B. District Court’s Decision 
Google maintained before the district court that it 
should have dismissed Joffe’s Wiretap Act claims 
because data transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi 
networks falls under the statutory exemption that 
makes it lawful to intercept “electronic 
communications” that are “readily accessible to the 
                                                 
2 The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss Joffe’s 
claims under California law and other state wiretap statutes.  In re 
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 
1085–86.  These claims are not at issue here. 
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general public.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  The question 
was whether payload data transmitted on an 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is “readily accessible to the 
general public,” such that the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption 
applies to Google’s conduct. 
To answer this question, the district court first 
looked to the definitions supplied by the Act.  In re 
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 
2d at 1075–76.  The statute provides in relevant part 
that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ means, 
with respect to a radio communication, that such 
communication is not … (A) scrambled or encrypted.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).  An unencrypted radio 
communication is, therefore, “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  In short, intercepting an unencrypted 
radio communication does not give rise to liability 
under the Wiretap Act because of the combination of 
the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption and the § 2510(16) 
definition. 
The district court then considered whether data 
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is a “radio 
communication” because the phrase is not defined by 
the Act.  In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n 
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–81.  The court reasoned 
that “radio communication” encompasses only 
“traditional radio services,” and not other technologies 
that also transmit data using radio waves, such as 
cellular phones and Wi-Fi networks.3  Id. at 1079–83.  
Since Wi-Fi networks are not a “radio communication,” 
the definition of “readily accessible to the general 
public” provided by § 2510(16) does not apply because 
                                                 
3 It is less clear whether the district court’s definition also 
excludes television broadcasts.  Joffe argued at oral argument that 
television broadcasts are “traditional radio services.” 
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the definition is expressly limited to electronic 
communications that are radio communications. 
Finally, the court addressed whether data 
transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is 
nevertheless an “electronic communication” that is 
“readily accessible to the general public” under 
§  2511(2)(g)(i).  Id. at 1082–84.  Although the court 
determined that Wi-Fi networks do not involve a “radio 
communication” under § 2510(16) and are therefore not 
“readily accessible to the general public” by virtue of 
the definition of the phrase, it still had to resolve 
whether they are “readily accessible to the general 
public” as the phrase is ordinarily understood because 
the statute does not define the phrase as it applies to an 
“electronic communication” that is not a “radio 
communication.”  The court determined that data 
transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not 
“readily accessible to the general public.”  Id. at 1082–
83.  As a result, the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption does not 
apply to Google’s conduct.  The court accordingly 
declined to grant Google’s motion to dismiss Joffe’s 
Wiretap Act claims.  Id. at 1084. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WIRETAP ACT 
The Wiretap Act imposes liability on a person who 
“intentionally intercepts … any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), subject to a 
number of exemptions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)–(h).  
There are two exemptions that are relevant to our 
purposes.  First, the Wiretap Act exempts intercepting 
“an electronic communication made through an 
electronic communication system” if the system is 
configured so that it is “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  “Electronic 
communication” includes communication by radio, 18 
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U.S.C. § 2510(12), and “‘readily accessible to the 
general public’ means, with respect to a radio 
communication” that the communication is “not … 
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).  
Second, the Act exempts intercepting “radio 
communication” by “any station for the use of the 
general public;” by certain governmental 
communication systems “readily accessible to the 
general public,” including police, fire, and civil defense 
agencies; by a station operating on an authorized 
frequency for “amateur, citizens band, or general 
mobile radio services;” or by a marine or aeronautical 
communications system.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)–
(IV). 
Google only argues, as it did before the district 
court, that it is exempt from liability under the Act 
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an 
“electronic communication … readily accessible to the 
general public” under § 2511(2)(g)(i).  It concedes that it 
does not qualify for any of the exemptions for specific 
types of “radio communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii).  
Joffe, however, argues that if data transmitted over a 
Wi-Fi network is not exempt as a “radio 
communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii), it cannot be 
exempt as a radio communication under the broader 
exemption for “electronic communication” in 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  This argument has some force, and we 
wish to address it before we consider Google’s claims. 
Joffe contends that the definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” in § 2510(16) does not 
apply to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption.  Instead, Joffe 
argues, the § 2510(16) definition applies exclusively to 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), which exempts specifically 
enumerated types of “radio communication” when they 
are “readily accessible to the general public.”  We 
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ultimately reject Joffe’s alternative reading of the 
statute, although—as we will explain—we find 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) useful as a lexigraphical aid to 
understanding the phrase “radio communication.” 
As noted, § 2510(16) defines “readily accessible to 
the general public” solely with respect to a “radio 
communication,” and not with respect to other types of 
“electronic communication.”  Although § 2511(2)(g)(i) 
does not use the words “radio communication,” the 
statute nevertheless directs us to apply the § 2510(16) 
definition to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption.  First, “radio 
communication” is a subset of “electronic 
communication.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (providing 
that, subject to certain exceptions, “‘electronic 
communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system”) (emphasis added).  Second, the statute directs 
us to apply § 2510(16) to the entire chapter.  The 
definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 are prefaced with the 
phrase, “As used in this chapter.”  We cannot disregard 
this command by holding that the definition of “‘readily 
accessible to the general public’ [ ] with respect to a 
radio communication” applies to § 2511(2)(g)(ii), but not 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
Admittedly, following the plain language of the 
statute creates some tension with § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), 
which provides an exemption for intercepting “any 
radio communication which is transmitted … by any 
governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private 
land mobile, or public communications system, 
including police and fire, readily accessible to the 
general public.”  Under our reading of the statute—
which is the same reading adopted by the district court, 
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Google, and Joffe in his lead argument—§ 2511(2)(g)(i) 
exempts all electronic communications (including radio 
communications) that are “readily accessible to the 
general public” as the phrase is defined in § 2510(16).  
This reading likely renders § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) 
superfluous.  As discussed, that section exempts 
specific kinds of radio communications that are “readily 
accessible to the general public,” such as those 
transmitted by a law enforcement communications 
system.  But this exemption is unnecessary when 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) already exempts all radio 
communications that are “readily accessible to the 
general public.” 
Although our reading may render 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) superfluous or at least redundant, we 
understand that Congress “sometimes drafts provisions 
that appear duplicative of others—simply in Macbeth’s 
words, ‘to make assurance double sure.’  That is, 
Congress means to clarify what might be doubtful—
that the mentioned item is covered.”  Shook v. D.C. 
Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 
F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  This interpretation is 
especially plausible given that Congress was concerned 
that radio hobbyists not face liability for intercepting 
readily accessible broadcasts, such as those covered by 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), which can be picked up by a police 
scanner.  See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04 (1986) (“In order 
to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, we modified the 
original language of S. 1667 to clarify that intercepting 
traditional radio services is not unlawful.”). 
In short, we agree with Google that the definition 
of “readily accessible to the general public” in 
§ 2510(16) applies to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption when 
the communication in question is a “radio 
communication.”  With that understanding, we now 
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turn to whether data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network 
is a “radio communication” exempt from the Wiretap 
Act as an “electronic communication” under 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
III. ANALYSIS 
In support of its position that it is exempt under 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), Google offers two arguments.  First, it 
contends that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is 
an electronic “radio communication” and that the Act 
exempts such communications by defining them as 
“readily accessible to the general public,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), so long as “such communication is not … 
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).  
Second, Google contends that even if data transmitted 
over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not a “radio 
communication,” it is still an “electronic communication 
… readily accessible to the general public.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
We reject both claims.4  We hold that the phrase 
“radio communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) excludes 
payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.  As a 
consequence, the definition of “readily accessible to the 
general public [ ] with respect to a radio 
communication” set forth in § 2510(16) does not apply to 
the exemption for an “electronic communication” that is 
                                                 
4 This case raises a question of statutory interpretation, 
which we review de novo.  Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 
F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010).  We begin by “determin[ing] 
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”  
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).  We must 
assume that “the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose [of Congress].”  Park ’N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). 
41a 
 
“readily accessible to the general public” under 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).  We further hold that payload 
data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is 
not “readily accessible to the general public” under the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase as it is used in 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
A. Data Transmitted over a Wi-Fi Network Is Not 
a“Radio Communication” under the Wiretap Act. 
We turn first to the question of whether data 
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is a “radio 
communication” as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16).  If data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is 
a radio communication, then any radio communication 
that is not scrambled or encrypted is considered 
“readily accessible to the general public,” and is exempt 
from liability under the Wiretap Act.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
1. The ordinary meaning of “radio 
communication” does not include data 
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network 
The Wiretap Act does not define the phrase “radio 
communication” so we must give the term its ordinary 
meaning.  See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 
2471 (2010) (“When terms used in a statute are 
undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”); 
United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“If the statute uses a term which it does not 
define, the court gives that term its ordinary 
meaning.”). 
According to Google, radio communication “refers 
to any information transmitted using radio waves, i.e., 
the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.”  Appellant’s Br. at 28.  The radio frequency 
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portion of the spectrum is “the part of the spectrum 
where electromagnetic waves have frequencies in the 
range of about 3 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz.”  Id. at 27. 
Google’s technical definition does not conform with 
the common understanding held contemporaneous with 
the enacting Congress.  See United States v. Iverson, 
162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When a statute 
does not define a term, we generally interpret that 
term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and 
common meaning of the words that Congress used”) 
(emphasis added).  The radio frequency portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum covers not only Wi-Fi 
transmissions, but also television broadcasts, Bluetooth 
devices, cordless and cellular phones, garage door 
openers, avalanche beacons, and wildlife tracking 
collars.  See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Encyclopedia – 
FM Broadcast Station Classes and Service Countours, 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
publications/2003-allochrt.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 
2013).  One would not ordinarily consider, say, 
television a form of “radio communication.”  Not 
surprisingly, Congress has not typically assumed that 
the term “radio” encompasses the term “television.”  
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (imposing liability for “[f]raud 
by wire, radio, or television”) (emphasis added); 18 
U.S.C. § 2101 (imposing liability for inciting a riot by 
means of “mail, telegraph, radio, or television”) 
(emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (defining an 
“instrumentality of interstate commerce” as “any 
written, wire, radio, television or other form of 
communication); see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. 
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 815 (1978) (noting that “radio 
and television stations are given different weight,” 
under the regulations at issue, and describing 
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regulations governing “a radio or television broadcast 
station”) (emphasis added). 
The Wiretap Act itself does not assume that the 
phrase “radio communication” encompasses 
technologies like satellite television that are outside the 
scope of the phrase as it is ordinarily defined.  For 
example, the statute’s damages provision sets out 
specified penalties when the “violation of this chapter is 
the private viewing of a private satellite video 
communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if 
the communication is a radio communication that is 
transmitted on [frequencies specified by regulation].”  
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (emphasis added).  Congress 
described separately the act of “viewing [ ] a private 
satellite video communication” even though such 
communication is transmitted on a radio frequency and 
would fall within Google’s proposed definition of “radio 
communication.”  Taken together, these disparate 
provisions offer evidence that Congress does not use 
“radio” or “radio communication” to reference all of the 
myriad forms of communication that use the radio 
spectrum.  Rather, it uses “radio” to refer to traditional 
radio technologies, and then separately describes other 
modes of communication that are not ordinarily thought 
of as radio, but that nevertheless use the radio 
spectrum. 
Google’s proposed definition is in tension with how 
Congress—and virtually everyone else—uses the 
phrase.  In common parlance, watching a television 
show does not entail “radio communication.”  Nor does 
sending an email or viewing a bank statement while 
connected to a Wi-Fi network.  There is no indication 
that the Wiretap Act carries a buried implication that 
the phrase ought to be given a broader definition than 
the one that is commonly understood.  See Mohamad v. 
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Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2012) 
(favoring a definition that matches “how we use the 
word in everyday parlance” and observing that 
“Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a 
broader or different meaning.  But before we will 
assume it has done so, there must be some indication 
Congress intended such a result”). 
Importantly, Congress provided definitions for 
many other similar terms in the Wiretap Act, but 
refrained from providing a technical definition of “radio 
communication” that would have altered the notion that 
it should carry its common, ordinary meaning.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (defining “wire communication”); 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic 
communication”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining 
“electronic communication service”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(17) (defining “electronic storage”).  As Google 
writes in its brief, “[t]he fact that the Wiretap Act 
provides specialized definitions for certain compound 
terms—but not for ‘radio communication’—is powerful 
evidence that the undefined term was not similarly 
intended [to] be defined in a specialized or narrow way” 
but rather “according to its ordinary meaning.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 29.  We agree and, accordingly, we 
reject Google’s proposed definition of “radio 
communication” in favor of one that better reflects the 
phrase’s ordinary meaning. 
2. A “radio communication” is a predominantly 
auditory broadcast, which excludes payload 
data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks 
There are two telltale indicia of a “radio 
communication.”  A radio communication is commonly 
understood to be (1) predominantly auditory, and (2) 
broadcast.  Therefore, television—whether connected 
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via an indoor antenna or a satellite dish—is not radio, 
by virtue of its visual component.  A land line phone 
does not broadcast, and, for that reason, is not radio.  
On the other hand, AM/FM, Citizens Band (CB), 
‘walkie-talkie,’ and shortwave transmissions are 
predominantly auditory, are broadcast, and are, not 
coincidentally, typically referred to as “radio” in 
everyday parlance.  Thus, we conclude that “radio 
communication” should carry its ordinary meaning: a 
predominantly auditory broadcast.5 
The payload data transmitted over unencrypted 
Wi-Fi networks that was captured by Google included 
emails, usernames, passwords, images, and documents 
that cannot be classified as predominantly auditory.  
They therefore fall outside of the definition of a “radio 
communication” as the phrase is used in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16). 
                                                 
5 We need not reach the question of what exactly constitutes 
a “broadcast” because the Wi-Fi transmissions in question were 
not predominantly auditory.  Whether cell phone calls—which are 
projected wirelessly over great distances—are broadcast would 
similarly be a close question. 
We also need not fully consider the extent to which non-
auditory transmissions may be included in a broadcast before that 
broadcast is no longer a radio broadcast.  Modern FM radio 
stations, for example, commonly transmit small amounts of data 
denoting the artist and title of the song.  But because such data is 
ancillary to the audio transmission, they likely do not remove the 
transmissions from the domain of a “radio communication” under 
the Act. 
And, finally, we do not address how to classify a traditional 
radio broadcast delivered to a web-enabled device connected to a 
Wi-Fi network, such as a radio station streamed over the internet.  
Here, Google’s collection efforts were not limited to auditory 
transmissions. 
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3. Defining “radio communication” to include only 
predominantly auditory broadcasts is 
consistent with the rest of the Wiretap Act 
Crucially, defining “radio communication” as a 
predominantly auditory broadcast yields a coherent 
and consistent Wiretap Act.  Google’s overly broad 
definition does not.  See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain 
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the 
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 
language and design of the statute as a whole.”) 
Throughout the Wiretap Act, Congress used the 
phrase “radio communication”—which is at issue 
here—and the similar phrase “communication by 
radio.”  Even within the very provision that we are 
construing—18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)—Congress used both 
phrases.  We must ascribe to each phrase its own 
meaning.  See SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory 
interpretation that the use of different words or terms 
within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended 
to convey a different meaning for those words.”).  The 
phrase “communication by radio” is used more 
expansively: it conjures an image of all communications 
using radio waves or a radio device.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16)(E) (describing radio communication that “is 
a two-way voice communication by radio transmitted 
on a frequency “not exclusively allocated to broadcast 
auxiliary services.”). 
When read in context, the phrase “radio 
communication” tends to refer more narrowly to 
broadcast radio technologies rather than to the radio 
waves by which the communication is made.  “Radio 
communication” is typically surrounded by words that 
47a 
 
evoke traditional radio technologies whenever it is used 
in the Act.  See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 
575 (1995) (“”[A] word is known by the company it 
keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis).  This rule we 
rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so 
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying 
words, thus giving ‘unintended breadth to the Acts of 
Congress.’”).  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii), 
inter alia, exempts from liability the interception of 
“any radio communication which is transmitted … by a 
station operating on an authorized frequency within the 
bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or 
general mobile radio services.”  These are traditional 
audio broadcasts that fit squarely within the ordinary 
meaning of “radio communication.”  The phrase “radio 
communication” is used five times in the Wiretap Act.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii), 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(v), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(i)(B), 18 
U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1).  Defining the term as a 
predominantly auditory broadcast would not distort the 
meaning of any of these provisions or otherwise lead to 
incoherence or inconsistency. 
On the other hand, the Wiretap Act uses 
“communication by radio” to refer more broadly to any 
communication transmitted by radio wave.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication” 
to include any communication “transmitted in whole or 
in part by … radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(ii) 
(prohibiting the use of a “device to intercept any oral 
communication” if the “device transmits 
communications by radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b) 
(authorizing FCC employees, in carrying out their 
official duties, “to intercept … [an] oral communication 
transmitted by radio”).  Congress’s decision to use both 
of these phrases implies that it intended to distinguish 
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“radio communication” from “communications by radio.”  
See McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656.  Ideally, Congress would 
have supplied definitions to make the distinction 
between these terms more apparent.  Nevertheless, by 
relying on their ordinary meaning and evaluating how 
they are used in context, we conclude that the former 
refers more narrowly to a predominantly auditory 
broadcast while only the latter encompasses other 
communications made using radio waves. 
The way the phrase “radio communication” is used 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) is particularly relevant in 
defining the term because that provision specifically 
exempts from liability the interception of certain kinds 
of radio communication.  The provision is not directly at 
issue here because—as Google acknowledges—Google’s 
conduct is not encompassed by any of the 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) exemptions, hence its reliance on 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).  But it is instructive to understand the 
types of communication exempted by § 2511(2)(g)(ii) 
since the phrase “radio communication” is “known by 
the company it keeps,” Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575.  The 
exemptions include, inter alia, radio communications 
transmitted “by any station for the use of the general 
public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I), “by a station 
operating on an authorized frequency within the bands 
allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general 
mobile radio services,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(III), 
and “by any marine or aeronautical communications 
system,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(IV).  Other than the 
fact that they all use the radio spectrum, these radio 
communications have little in common with a home Wi-
Fi network.  Of course § 2511(2)(g)(i) exempts radio 
communications that are “readily accessible to the 
general public” even if they are not specifically set out 
in § 2511(2)(g)(ii).  But it would be odd for Congress to 
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take pains to identify particular kinds of radio 
communications that should be exempt in 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) only to exempt broad swaths of 
dissimilar communications, such as data transmitted 
over a Wi-Fi network, under the auspices of 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). It is more sensible to read the general 
exemption in § 2511(2)(g)(i)—insofar as it applies to 
“radio communication” rather than other kinds of 
“electronic communication”—in light of the specific 
exemptions in § 2511(2)(g)(ii). 
Relatedly, giving “radio communication” its 
ordinary meaning as a predominantly auditory 
broadcast also avoids producing absurd results that are 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  See Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) 
(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce 
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative 
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose 
are available.”); Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schools v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]ell-accepted rules of statutory construction 
caution us that ‘statutory interpretations which would 
produce absurd results are to be avoided.’  When a 
natural reading of the statutes leads to a rational, 
common-sense result, an alteration of meaning is not 
only unnecessary, but also extrajudicial.”).  Under the 
expansive definition of “radio communication” proposed 
by Google, the protections afforded by the Wiretap Act 
to many online communications would turn on whether 
the recipient of those communications decided to secure 
her wireless network.  A “radio communication” is 
“readily accessible to the general public” and, 
therefore, exempt from Wiretap Act liability if it is not 
scrambled or encrypted.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).  
Consider an email attachment containing sensitive 
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personal information sent from a secure Wi-Fi network 
to a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or spouse.  A 
company like Google that intercepts the contents of 
that email from the encrypted home network has, quite 
understandably, violated the Wiretap Act.  But the 
sender of the email is in no position to ensure that the 
recipient—be it a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or 
spouse—has taken care to encrypt her own Wi-Fi 
network.  Google, or anyone else, could park outside of 
the recipient’s home or office with a packet sniffer 
while she downloaded the attachment and intercept its 
contents because the sender’s “radio communication” is 
“readily accessible to the general public” solely by 
virtue of the fact that the recipient’s Wi-Fi network is 
not encrypted.  Surely Congress did not intend to 
condone such an intrusive and unwarranted invasion of 
privacy when it enacted the Wiretap Act “to protect 
against the unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications.”  S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), at 1; see 
also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 
875 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The legislative history of the 
[Wiretap Act] suggests that Congress wanted to 
protect electronic communications that are configured 
to be private, such as email.”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The 
paramount objective of the Wiretap Act is to protect 
effectively the privacy of communications.”). 
The definition of “readily accessible to the general 
public” in § 2510(16) is limited to “radio 
communication,” and does not encompass all “electronic 
communication.”  Congress’s decision to carve out 
“radio communication” for less protection than some 
other types of “electronic communication” makes sense 
if “radio communication” is given its ordinary meaning.  
Traditional radio services can be easily and mistakenly 
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intercepted by hobbyists.  See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04 
(1986) (“In order to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, 
we modified the original language of S. 1667 to clarify 
that intercepting traditional radio services is not 
unlawful.”).  But “radio hobbyists” do not mistakenly 
use packet sniffers to intercept payload data 
transmitted on Wi-Fi networks.  Lending “radio 
communication” a broad definition that encompasses 
data transmitted on Wi-Fi networks would obliterate 
Congress’s compromise and create absurd applications 
of the exemption for intercepting unencrypted radio 
communications.  For example, § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) 
exempts from liability, inter alia, the act of 
intercepting “any radio communication which is 
transmitted … by any governmental, law enforcement 
… or public safety communications system, including 
police and fire, readily accessible to the general public.”  
This provision reinforces the work performed by 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), which already exempts a “radio 
communication” that is “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  Congress’s decision to ensure that 
these communications were exempt makes sense if 
“radio communication” encompasses only 
predominantly auditory broadcasts since these 
transmissions can be picked up by widely available 
police scanners.  But if “radio communication” includes 
data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks, then 
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) also underscores that liability should 
not attach to intercepting data from an unencrypted 
Wi-Fi network operated by, say, a police department or 
government agency.  It seems doubtful that Congress 
wanted to emphasize that Google or anyone else could 
park outside of a police station that carelessly failed to 
secure its Wi-Fi network and intercept confidential 
data with impunity. 
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Next, Google strenuously argues that the rest of 
the Wiretap Act supports its position that “radio 
communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) means “any 
information transmitted using radio waves.”  Google 
leans heavily on § 2510(16)(D) and the accompanying 
legislative history, which together suggest that cellular 
telephone and paging systems are a form of “radio 
communication.”  If cell phone and paging systems are 
a type of “radio communication,” Google argues, it must 
be the case that Congress intended that the phrase 
include Wi-Fi networks and the rest of the radio 
spectrum because these technologies differ from 
paradigmatic radio communications like AM/FM, CB, 
and shortwave transmissions.  But cell phone 
communications were not dissimilar from CB, 
shortwave, or other two-way forms of traditional radio 
broadcasts when § 2510(16)(D) was added to the 
Wiretap Act in 1986 as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848.  When Congress enacted § 2510(16)(D), cell 
phones were still called “cellular radiotelephones.”  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (1986).  As with other audio 
broadcasts, cellular conversations were often 
inadvertently picked up by radio hobbyists “scanning 
radio frequencies in order to receive public 
communications.”  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3560 (1986); 
see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (“Cellular 
telephone calls can be intercepted by either 
sophisticated scanners designed for that purpose, or by 
regular radio scanners modified to intercept cellular 
calls”).  The fact that technology has evolved and 
cellular communications are no longer as similar to CB 
broadcasts as they once were does not require us to 
read “radio communication” to include all 
communications made using radio waves.  Rather, the 
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historical context surrounding Congress’s protection of 
cellular conversations as a form of a “radio 
communication” is consistent with the commonsense 
definition of the term because, at the time of the 
enactment of the definition in 1986, cellular 
conversations could have reasonably been construed as 
analogous to a form of two-way radio.6  Assuming, 
arguendo, that the phrase “radio communication” 
covers cell phone transmissions as they existed in 1986 
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that it also 
encompasses transmissions that are plainly not 
predominantly auditory broadcasts, such as payload 
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. 
Google also looks beyond the Wiretap Act in an 
effort to fit its expansive definition of “radio 
communication” into the statutory scheme.  It points 
out that the Communications Act expressly defines the 
phrases “radio communication” and “communication by 
radio” broadly to include “the transmission by radio of 
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all 
                                                 
6 With modern advances in cellular technology, it is less clear 
how cell phones would fit within the statutory scheme today.  We 
need not resolve this question here.  Whether cell phone 
transmissions are an example of a “radio communication” is 
relevant to defining the phrase, but it is not a precursor to 
observing that a “radio communication” is ordinarily a 
predominantly auditory broadcast or to holding that payload data 
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio communication.”  
We previously held that cell phone communications are “wire 
communications” for purposes of the Wiretap Act, but we did not 
address whether they are an example of a “radio communication.”  
See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of 
Oral Commc'ns, 349 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Despite 
the apparent wireless nature of cellular phones, communications 
using cellular phones are considered wire communications under 
the statute, because cellular telephones use wire and cable 
connections when connecting calls.”). 
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kinds.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(40).  But when Congress 
wanted to borrow a definition from the 
Communications Act to apply to the Wiretap Act, it 
expressly said so.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (giving the 
phrase “communication common carrier” the meaning 
that it has “in section 3 of the Communications Act”).  
Here, Congress refrained from incorporating the 
definition of “radio communication” used in the 
Communications Act.  And, as previously discussed, the 
Wiretap Act uses the phrases “radio communication” 
and “communication by radio” differently, indicating 
that Congress did not intend to import the 
Communications Act’s definition, which treats them as 
synonyms.  See 47 U.S.C. § 153(40).  Furthermore, the 
Communication Act’s definition of “radio 
communication” encompasses technologies like 
television by including “the transmission by radio of … 
pictures … of all kinds,” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40), while the 
Wiretap Act sometimes distinguishes them.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (providing specified penalties 
when the “violation of this chapter is the private 
viewing of a private satellite video communication that 
is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication 
is a radio communication that is transmitted on 
[frequencies specified by regulation]”).  Separate 
references to television-related communications would 
be redundant when paired with the phrase “radio 
communication” if we were to assume that the 
Communication Act’s definition applied to the Wiretap 
Act.  Importantly, the presumption that a definition set 
out in one part of the code is intended to govern 
another is hardly unyielding in the face of such 
contradictory evidence.  See, e.g., General Dynamics 
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004) 
(holding that the word “age” carries a different 
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meaning in different sections of the ADEA); Robinson 
v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997) (holding that the 
term “employees” carries a different meaning in 
different sections of Title VII). 
Google also leans heavily on a series of 
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) to argue that 
Congress impliedly gave the phrase “radio 
communication” a meaning other than the ordinary one 
that we adopt here.  In 1990, Senator Patrick Leahy 
commissioned a task force to study the effect of new 
technologies, including the precursors to wireless 
networking, on the statutory scheme created in 1986 by 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.  See S. 
Hrg. 103-1022, at 179 (1994).  In its report, the task 
force indicated it was concerned that communications 
by “‘wireless modems’ which can transmit data 
between computers … will not be protected unless the 
user goes to the expense of full data encryption.”  Id. at 
183.  The section of the report on “Wireless Data 
Communications” concluded that “[t]he task force 
recommends appropriate amendments to legally 
protect digital communications of this type from 
unauthorized interception.”  Id.  In short, the task force 
was of the opinion that the version of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16) enacted in 1986 did not adequately protect 
unencrypted “wireless data communications.”  The task 
force must have implicitly decided that “wireless data 
communications” were a “radio communication” 
because otherwise it would not have been concerned 
with § 2510(16), which only applies to “radio 
communication.”  See id. 
In 1994, Congress amended § 2510(16) to add a new 
category of communication—which it called an 
“electronic communication”—that it deemed to be a 
“radio communication” that was not “readily accessible 
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to the general public.”  In relevant part, the statute 
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ 
means, with respect to a radio communication, that 
such communication is not … (F) an electronic 
communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (1994).  Google 
claims that Congress added § 2510(16)(F) in 1994 in 
order to protect from interception new technologies 
that transmitted data using radio frequencies, including 
the contemporary versions of wireless networks.  
There is some support for this proposition in the 
congressional record.  See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 18 
(1994) (explaining that the bill “[e]xtends privacy 
protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act to cordless phones and certain data 
communications transmitted by radio”). 
The significance of all of this is that Congress 
repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) in 1996.  Google 
attempts to draw a series of inferences from the 1994 
and 1996 amendments:  The 1994 Congress thought 
that data transmissions across the wireless networks of 
the day were a type of “radio communication.”  
Otherwise, Congress would not have needed to amend 
§ 2510(16) in order to shield them from interception 
given that the provision only applies to “radio 
communication.”  By deleting § 2510(16)(F), the 1996 
Congress removed the sole protection for unencrypted 
data transmissions over wireless networks by 
returning § 2510(16) to its pre-amendment form.  From 
Google’s perspective, the upshot of this historical 
narrative is that payload data transmitted over an 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is a “radio communication” 
that is “readily accessible to the general public” before 
the 1994 amendment and, crucially, after the 1996 
repeal. 
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This evidence of congressional action and inaction 
is far more equivocal than Google acknowledges.  First, 
the task force’s report does not control what the phrase 
“radio communication” meant to Congress when it 
enacted § 2510(16) in 1986.  The task force’s report 
suggests that it thought that the “wireless data 
communication” technology that existed in 1991 
entailed “radio communication” as the phrase is used in 
§ 2510(16).  But the task force’s opinion on questions of 
statutory interpretation has no independent authority; 
it is not charged with divining congressional intent.  
The task force’s recommendation informs us that in 
1991 a group of fifteen individuals thought that early 
versions of wireless networks involved “radio 
communication” under the statute.  Their opinion is not 
indicative of what Congress intended when it included 
the phrase in the Wiretap Act.  It may be considered 
evidence of the phrase’s ordinary meaning.  But it does 
not outweigh the more substantial evidence, discussed 
at length above, indicating that the ordinary meaning of 
“radio communication” excludes data transmitted over 
a Wi-Fi network. 
Second, Congress’s decision to add § 2510(16)(F) in 
1994 does not prove that it thought data transmitted 
over a Wi-Fi network constituted a “radio 
communication.”  The 1994 Congress was certainly 
concerned about ensuring that “certain data 
communications transmitted by radio” were protected 
from interception.  But that does not necessarily mean 
that it was of the view that such communications were 
a “radio communication” under § 2510(16).  Congress 
might have been forestalling the possibility that 
evolving technologies would be construed as radio 
communications, contrary to the ordinary meaning of 
the phrase. 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is no 
reliable indication of what the 1996 Congress intended 
to accomplish by repealing § 2510(16)(F).  Google mines 
the 1991 task force report and the 1994 congressional 
record, but it cannot close the loop on its argument 
because the 1996 Congress did not leave behind the 
snippets of enactment history that are essential to 
Google’s narrative.  Consider two possible rationales 
for the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F): first, Congress 
might have deleted the provision because it found it 
redundant.  That is, Congress might have thought that 
data transmitted over a radio frequency was not a 
“radio communication,” which would render the 
additional protection for such communications offered 
by § 2510(16)(F) unnecessary. 
Alternatively, Congress might have (correctly) 
determined that § 2510(16)(F) made the statute 
incoherent.  Recall that the short-lived provision 
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ 
means, with respect to a radio communication, that 
such communication is not … (F) an electronic 
communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) (1994).  The 
phrase “electronic communication” has been broadly 
defined since the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986.  In 1994, when § 2510(16)(F) was added, 
the Wiretap Act provided—as it still does today—that 
“‘electronic communication’ means any transfer of 
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in 
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic 
or photooptical system that affects interstate 
commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).  As Google stresses 
in its briefs, and the statute plainly states, “radio 
communication” is a subset of “electronic 
communication.”  Yet § 2510(16)(F) conveyed that a 
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“radio communication” was not “readily accessible to 
the general public” if it was an “electronic 
communication,” which incoherently implies that the 
latter was a subset of the former.  The repeal of 
§ 2510(16)(F) could, therefore, have been a 
housekeeping matter designed to resolve this internal 
tension without affecting the protection afforded 
“electronic communications, including data” that the 
1994 Congress sought to protect. 
Neither of these entirely plausible explanations for 
the amendment and repeal are consistent with Google’s 
assumption that the pre-1994 conception of “radio 
communication” included data transmitted over a Wi-Fi 
network and the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F) sought to 
restore that conception.  The point is that we do not 
know why the 1996 Congress deleted § 2510(16)(F).  
We choose to rely on the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase “radio communication” rather than follow a trail 
of enactment history that culminates in silence and 
then speculate as to Congress’s unexpressed intent. 
Finally, Google’s fall back position is that the rule 
of lenity dictates that we accept its proposed definition 
of “radio communication.”  Although this is a civil suit, 
the Wiretap Act also carries criminal penalties so 
Google’s reliance on the rule of lenity is not unfounded.  
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) 
(“Because we must interpret the statute consistently, 
whether we encounter its application in a criminal or 
noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”).  But 
we do not resort to the rule of lenity every time a 
difficult question of statutory interpretation arises.  
Rather, “the rule of lenity only applies if, after 
considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there 
remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute.’”  Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 
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(2010) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (“The mere possibility 
of articulating a narrower construction [ ] does not 
make the rule of lenity applicable.  Instead, that 
venerable rule is reserved for cases where, ‘[a]fter 
“seizing every thing from which aid can be derived,”’ 
the Court is ‘left with an ambiguous statute.’”) 
(citations omitted).  Here, the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation are sufficient.  The ordinary 
meaning of “radio communication” is consistent with 
the structure of the Act and avoids absurd results 
without running afoul of any clearly expressed 
congressional intent.  We need not resort to the rule of 
lenity where, as here, the ambiguity can be fairly 
resolved. 
B. Wi-Fi Transmissions Are Not “Readily Accessible 
to the General Public” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) 
In the previous section, we concluded that payload 
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio 
communication” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).  As a 
result, the definition of “readily accessible to the 
general public” in § 2510(16) does not apply to the 
exemption for intercepting an “electronic 
communication” that is “readily accessible to the 
general public” in § 2511(2)(g)(i).  But that does not end 
the inquiry.  Although payload data transmitted over 
an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not “readily 
accessible to the general public” by definition solely 
because it is an unencrypted “radio communication,” it 
is still possible for a transmission that falls outside of 
the purview of the § 2510(16) definition to be 
considered “readily accessible to the general public” 
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under the ordinary meaning of that phrase.7  We now 
hold, in agreement with the district court, that payload 
data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is 
not “readily accessible to the general public” and, 
consequently, that Google cannot avail itself of the 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption. 
First, Wi-Fi transmissions are not “readily” 
available because they are geographically limited and 
fail to travel far beyond the walls of the home or office 
where the access point is located. Google was only able 
to intercept the plaintiffs’ communications because its 
Street View vehicles passed by the street outside of 
each plaintiff’s house.  The FCC generally limits the 
peak output of Wi-Fi broadcasts to 1 watt.  See 47 
C.F.R. § 15.247(b).  Meanwhile, AM, FM, and other 
traditional radio broadcasts typically range from 250 to 
100,000 watts.  See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 
Encyclopedia – FM Broadcast Station Classes and 
Service Countours, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/publications/2003-allochrt.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2013); see also Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 
                                                 
7 The phrase “readily accessible to the general public” is only 
defined insofar as the communication at issue is a “radio 
communication.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (“‘readily accessible to 
the general public’ means, with respect to a radio communication 
…”).  The phrase is undefined where, as here, the transmission is 
an “electronic communication” that is not a “radio communication.”  
Since the term at issue is undefined, we look to its ordinary 
meaning.  See Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2471 (“When terms used in a 
statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”).  
Joffe does not dispute that payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi 
network is an “electronic communication,” which the Act defines 
as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce” subject to 
specific exceptions that do not apply here.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
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Encyclopedia – AM Broadcast Station Classes; Clear, 
Regional, and Local, available at http://www.fcc.gov/
encyclopedia/am-broadcast-stationclasses-clear-regional-
and-local-channels (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).  As a 
result, AM radio stations have a service range of up to 
100 miles, while individual Wi-Fi access points usually 
have a range of less than 330 feet.  See Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, Encyclopedia – Why AM Radio Stations 
Must Reduce Power, Change Operations, or Cease 
Broadcasting at Night, http://www.fcc.gov/
encyclopedia/why-am-radio-stations-must-reduce-power
-changeoperations-or-cease-broadcasting-night (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2013); Encyclopedia Brittanica Online, 
Wi-Fi, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
1473553/Wi-Fi (last visited Aug. 13, 2013). 
Second, the payload data transmitted over 
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is only “accessible” with 
some difficulty.  Unlike traditional radio broadcasts, a 
Wi-Fi access point cannot associate or communicate 
with a wireless device until it has been authenticated.  
See IEEE Computer Soc’y, IEEE Standard for 
Information Technology — Telecommunications and 
Information Exchange Between Systems — Local and 
Metropolitan Area Networks — Specific Requirements: 
Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) 
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications 473, Fig. 11-
6 (2007).  Devices on Wi-Fi networks—even 
unencrypted networks—communicate via encoded 
messages sent to a specific destination over the 
wireless channel.  Id.  Therefore, intercepting and 
decoding payload data communicated on a Wi-Fi 
network requires sophisticated hardware and software.  
To capture this information, a wireless device must 
initiate a connection with the network and send 
encapsulated and coded data over the network to a 
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specific destination.  If the communications were 
intercepted by a traditional analog radio device they 
would sound indistinguishable from random noise.  Wi-
Fi transmissions are not “readily accessible” to the 
“general public” because most of the general public 
lacks the expertise to intercept and decode payload 
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.8  Even if it is 
commonplace for members of the general public to 
connect to a neighbor’s unencrypted Wi-Fi network, 
members of the general public do not typically 
mistakenly intercept, store, and decode data 
transmitted by other devices on the network.  
Consequently, we conclude that Wi-Fi communications 
are sufficiently inaccessible that they do not constitute 
an “electronic communication … readily accessible to 
the general public” under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) as 
the phrase is ordinarily understood. 
                                                 
8 Google argues that unencrypted data transmitted over a Wi-
Fi network is “readily accessible to the general public” because the 
hardware used to intercept the data can be purchased by anyone 
and the software used to decode the data can be downloaded from 
the internet.  A district court also reached this conclusion in a 
patent case.  See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 
886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“In light of the ease of 
sniffing Wi–Fi networks, the court concludes that the 
communications sent on an unencrypted Wi–Fi network are 
readily accessible to the general public.”).  The availability of the 
technology necessary to intercept the communication cannot be 
the sole determinant of whether it is “readily accessible to the 
general public” as the phrase is ordinarily understood.  A device 
that surreptitiously logs a computer user’s keystrokes can be 
purchased online and easily installed, but that hardly means that 
every keystroke—whether over a wired or a wireless connection—
is “readily accessible to the general public.” 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
AFFIRMED. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
 
IN RE GOOGLE INC. STREET VIEW ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS LITIGATION 
 
No. C 10-MD-02184 JW 
Filed:  June 29, 2011 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 
PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 
LEAVE TO AMEND 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs1 bring this putative class action against 
Google, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging three causes of 
action for violation of the federal Wiretap Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2511, et seq., violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code §§ 17200, et seq., and violation of various state 
wiretap statutes.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 
intentionally intercepted data packets, including 
payload data, from Plaintiffs’ Wi-Fi networks utilizing 
specially designed packet sniffer software installed on 
Defendant’s Google Street View vehicles. 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs are Patrick Keyes, Matthew Berlage, Aaron 
Linsky, James Fairbanks, Jeffrey Colman, John Redstone, Karl 
Schulz, Dean Bastilla, Vicki Van Valin, Stephanie and Russell 
Carter, Danielle Reyas, Bertha Davis, Jason Taylor, Jennifer 
Locsin, James Blackwell, Rich Benitti, Benjamin Joffe, Lilla 
Marigza, Wesley Hartline, David Binkley and Eric Myhre. 
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Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss.2  The Court conducted a hearing on March 
21, 2011.  Based on the papers submitted to date and 
oral argument, the Court GRANTS in part and 
DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Allegations 
In a Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed on 
November 8, 2011,3 Plaintiffs allege as follows: 
 Plaintiffs are individuals who reside in various 
states,4 and who maintained a Wi-Fi network in 
their homes that was not readily accessible to the 
general public and used the Wi-Fi connection to 
send and receive various types of payload data, 
including usernames, passwords and personal 
emails.  (CCAC ¶¶ 18-38.)  Each of Plaintiffs’ 
homes can be seen depicted on Google Maps and 
Google Street View.  (Id.)  Defendant Google 
develops and hosts a broad range of Internet-based 
services and is incorporated under the laws of 
Delaware with its principal place of business in 
Mountain View, California.  (Id. ¶ 39.) 
 Defendant launched Google Street View on 
May 25, 2007 in several select cities across the 
United States.  (CCAC ¶ 55.)  In the last three 
                                                 
2 (Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, hereafter, “Motion,” Docket 
Item No. 60.) 
3 (Consolidated Class Action Complaint, hereafter, “CCAC,” 
Docket Item No. 54.) 
4 Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of Washington, D.C.; 
Ohio; Pennsylvania; Nevada; Tennessee; Washington; California; 
Illinois; and Oregon.  (CCAC ¶¶ 18-38.) 
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years, Google Street View has expanded broadly 
and now includes more cities and rural areas in the 
United States, and has expanded worldwide into 
more than 30 countries.  (Id.)  Google Street View 
is a feature embedded within Defendant’s Google 
Maps program that offers panoramic views of 
various positions along streets using photos taken 
from a fleet of specially adapted vehicles commonly 
known as Google Street View vehicles.  (Id. ¶¶ 54, 
55.)  Each Google Street View vehicle is equipped 
with nine directional cameras to capture 360 degree 
views of the streets and 3G/GSM/Wi-Fi antennas 
with custom-designed software for the capture and 
storage of wireless signals and data.  (Id. ¶ 55.)  
Additionally, Defendant used smaller vehicles, 
commonly known as Google Trikes, also outfitted 
with the cameras and Wi-Fi equipment, to capture 
photo and Wi-Fi data from areas inaccessible to 
cars.  (Id. ¶ 58.)  While Defendant issued press 
releases to the public to disclose its intent to utilize 
the vehicles in order to capture photo data, 
Defendant failed to disclose its intent to also 
capture Wi-Fi data.  (Id. ¶ 56.) 
 In 2006, prior to the launch of the Google Street 
View vehicles, Defendant’s employee engineers 
intentionally created a data collection system that 
included code that sampled, collected, decoded and 
analyzed all types of data broadcast through Wi-Fi 
connections.  (CCAC ¶¶ 60-61.)  This data collection 
system is commonly known as a packet analyzer, 
wireless sniffer, network analyzer, packet sniffer or 
protocol analyzer.  (Id. ¶ 61.)  Defendant authorized 
inclusion of this wireless sniffer technology into its 
Google Street View vehicles and even sought to 
patent the process.  (Id. ¶ 65.)  The wireless sniffer 
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secretly captures data packets as they stream 
across Wi-Fi connections and then decodes or 
decrypts the data packet and analyzes the contents.  
(Id. ¶ 62.)  In order to view the contents of the data 
packets captured by the wireless sniffer in a 
readable form, the packets must be stored on 
digital media and then decoded using crypto-
analysis or a similarly complicated technology.  (Id. 
¶ 63.)  As such, the data packets are not readable 
by the general public absent this sophisticated 
decoding and processing technology.  (Id. ¶ 64.)  
Defendant has admitted to storing this data on 
their servers.  (Id. ¶ 6.)  The content of the data 
packets collected by Defendant included Plaintiffs’ 
SSID information (the Wi-Fi network name), MAC 
address (the ID number of the Wi-Fi network’s 
hardware), usernames, passwords and personal 
emails.  (Id. ¶¶ 66, 69.) 
 On April 27, 2010, in response to an inquiry 
from a European privacy authority, Defendant 
posted an entry explaining that it had collected 
SSIDs and MAC addresses.  (CCAC ¶ 69.)  
However, at that time, Defendant claimed to have 
not collected any payload, or content data from the 
packets.  (Id. ¶ 70.)  On May 14, 2010, following a 
request by the privacy authority to audit packet 
data collected by Defendant, Defendant admitted to 
collecting “fragmentary” samples of “publicly 
broadcast” payload data from open (i.e., 
nonpassword-protected) Wi-Fi networks and that, 
through this conduct, it had collected about 600 
gigabytes of data from more than 30 countries.  (Id. 
¶¶ 71-72, 110.)  Prior to May 14, 2010, Plaintiffs 
were unaware of and could not have discovered the 
existence of Defendant’s unlawful conduct.  (Id. 
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¶¶ 100-10.)  On June 9, 2010, Defendant admitted 
that it had been collecting Wi-Fi data in the United 
States via Google Street View vehicles since 2007.  
(Id. ¶ 80.)  On July 9, 2010, Defendant issued an 
apology on its Official Google Australia Blog where 
it admitted to intercepting the data in an attempt 
to improve Defendant’s location-based services, 
e.g., search and maps.  (Id. ¶ 100.)  In October 2010, 
Defendant was forced to admit, following 
continuing investigations, that it had intercepted 
whole emails, usernames, passwords and other 
private data.  (Id. ¶ 77.) 
On the basis of the allegations outlined above, 
Plaintiffs allege three causes of action: (1) violation of 
the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, et seq.; (2) 
violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and 
(3) violation of various state wiretap statutes.  (CCAC 
at 28-31.) 
B. Procedural History 
On August 17, 2010, the United States Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred eight 
pending actions to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407.  (See Docket Item No. 1.)  On October 18, 2010, 
the Court appointed Jeffrey Kodoff of Spector 
Roseman Kodroff & Willis, P.C. and Daniel Small of 
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC as Interim Class 
and Co-Lead Counsel and Elizabeth Cabraser of Lieff 
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP as Interim Class 
and Liaison Counsel.  (See Docket Item No. 47.)  On 
November 8, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint.  (See CCAC.) 
On March 21, 2011, the Court conducted a hearing 
on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.  That same day, the 
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Court issued an Order directing the parties to submit 
supplemental briefs addressing three questions: (1) 
what “radio communication” means within the purview 
of the Wiretap Act; (2) whether wireless home internet 
networks are “radio communications” within the 
purview of the Wiretap Act’s usage of that term; and 
(3) whether cellular telephone calls constitute “radio 
communications” as intended by Congress when 
drafting the Wiretap Act and, if so, whether such 
technology properly fits within any of the five 
enumerated exceptions to the definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” as outlined in Section 
2510(16).  (See Docket Item No. 73.)  On April 11, 2011, 
the parties timely filed their Supplemental Briefs.  (See 
Docket Item Nos. 79, 80.)  Also on April 11, 2011, the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a Brief for 
Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiffs.  (See Docket 
Item No. 80.) 
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss. 
III. STANDARDS 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed against a 
defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted against that defendant.  Dismissal may 
be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory 
or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 
cognizable legal theory.  Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th 
Cir. 1984).  For purposes of evaluating a motion to 
dismiss, the court “must presume all factual allegations 
of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”  Usher v. 
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City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).  
Any existing ambiguities must be resolved in favor of 
the pleading.  Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 
396 (9th Cir. 1973). 
However, mere conclusions couched in factual 
allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action.  
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also 
McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th 
Cir. 1988).  The complaint must plead “enough facts to 
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  A 
claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 
1949 (2009).  Thus, “for a complaint to survive a motion 
to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and 
reasonable inferences from that content, must be 
plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to 
relief.”  Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 
(9th Cir. 2009).  Courts may dismiss a case without 
leave to amend if the plaintiff is unable to cure the 
defect by amendment.  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 
1129 (9th Cir. 2000). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to plead 
that their Wi-Fi broadcasts were not “readily 
accessible” and thus, Defendant is entitled to 
exemption from liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i), 
one of the Wiretap Act’s exemptions (“exemption G1”); 
(2) Plaintiffs’ claims based on state law wiretap statutes 
are preempted by the Wiretap Act and, alternatively, 
fail to state a claim; and (3) Plaintiffs’ “unlawful” and 
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“unfair” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 claims are also 
preempted by the Wiretap Act and, alternatively, fail 
to state a claim or plead standing under Proposition 64.  
(Motion at 5-19.)  Plaintiffs respond that dismissal is 
improper as: (1) the Wiretap Act’s statutory definition 
of “readily accessible” relied on by Defendant solely 
applies to “radio communications” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii) 
(“exemption G2”) and is, thus, inapplicable to 
“electronic communications” under exemption G1 and 
the ordinary meaning of “readily accessible” should be 
used; (2) additionally, exemption G1 only applies to 
unlawful interception and access, and Plaintiffs allege 
that Defendant further used and disclosed the 
intercepted communications; (3) the state wiretap 
statutes are not preempted by the Wiretap Act either 
expressly, by field preemption, or by conflict; and (4) 
claims under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., 
are not preempted by the Wiretap Act as they are 
qualitatively different and are properly pleaded.  
(Opp’n at 3-25.)  The Court addresses each ground in 
turn. 
A. Wiretap Act 
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ Wi-Fi 
broadcasts were “readily accessible to the general 
public,” per the statutory definition provided in Section 
2510(16) of the Wiretap Act, such that exemption G1 
obviates Defendant’s liability for any alleged 
interceptions.  (Motion at 5-12.)  Plaintiffs respond that 
the Section 2510(16) definition of “readily accessible to 
the general public” applies solely to “radio 
communications,” as specified, and thus would only 
apply to exemption G2 (“radio communications”) and 
not exemption G1 (“electronic communications”).  
(Opp’n at 2-10.) 
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The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) provides a 
private right of action against: 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
chapter any person who— 
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to 
intercept, or procures any other person to 
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication; … 
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to 
disclose, to any other person the contents 
of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing or having reason 
to know that the information was obtained 
through the interception of a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication in violation of 
this subsection; [or] 
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the 
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing or having reason 
to know that the information was obtained 
through the interception of a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication in violation of 
this subsection; … . 
However, Section 2511(2) provides exemptions to 
Section 2511(1)’s private right of action: 
(g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or 
chapter 121 of this title for any person— 
(i) to intercept or access an electronic 
communication made through an electronic 
communication system that is configured so 
that such electronic communication is 
readily accessible to the general public; 
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(ii) to intercept any radio communication 
which is transmitted— 
(I) by any station for the use of the 
general public, or that relates to ships, 
aircraft, vehicles or persons in distress; 
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, 
civil defense, private land mobile, or 
public safety communications system, 
including police and fire, readily 
accessible to the general public; 
(III) by a station operating on an authorized 
frequency within the bands allocated to 
the amateur, citizens band, or general 
mobile radio services; or 
(IV) by any marine or aeronautical 
communications system; … . 
Section 2510(16) provides the sole definition in the 
Wiretap Act for “readily accessible to the general 
public”: 
(16) “readily accessible to the general public” 
means, with respect to a radio communication, 
that such communication is not— 
(A) scrambled or encrypted; 
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques 
whose essential parameters have been 
withheld from the public with the intention 
of preserving the privacy of such 
communication; 
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal 
subsidiary to a radio transmission;  
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(D) transmitted over a communication system 
provided by a common carrier, unless the 
communication is a tone only paging 
system communication; or 
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under 
part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or 
part 94 of the Rules of the Federal 
Communications Commission, unless, in 
the case of a communication transmitted on 
a frequency allocated under part 74 that is 
not exclusively allocated to broadcast 
auxiliary services, the communication is a 
two-way communication by radio; … . 
18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
The matter before the Court presents a case of first 
impression as to whether the Wiretap Act imposes 
liability upon a defendant who allegedly intentionally 
intercepts data packets from a wireless home network.  
The case also presents a novel question of statutory 
interpretation as to how the definition in Section 
2510(16) of “readily accessible to the general public” 
modifies exemption G1, if at all. 
In establishing the standard principles of statutory 
construction, the Supreme Court has held that the 
starting point at which courts should discern 
congressional intent is always the existing statutory 
text.  Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).  
Unless a court finds the existing statutory text such 
that a plain meaning interpretation would lead to 
absurd results, the court is bound to enforce the 
existing text according to its terms.  Id. (citing Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).  “In ascertaining the plain meaning 
of the statute, the court must look to the particular 
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statutory language at issue, as well as the language and 
design of the statute as a whole.”  K-Mart Corp. v. 
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).  One measure of 
ambiguity is that the statutory text at issue is fairly 
capable of more than one interpretation.  Chickasaw 
Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001).  Should 
a court find the statutory text ambiguous or should a 
plain text reading fail to yield a definitive 
interpretation, a court may then turn to the legislative 
history in order to add context to the statute.  SEC v. 
McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2003). 
1. Plain Text Reading 
In this case, Congress has not expressly declared 
its intent as to how Section 2510(16) should apply to 
exemption G1 in the plain text of the statute, nor has 
Congress defined “radio communication” anywhere 
within the Act.  As Congress has not provided a 
definition for “radio communication” within the 
confines of the Act, the Court first attempts to discern 
the ordinary and plain meaning of the term from the 
context of its use, from dictionary references and from 
Congress’ use of similar terms within the Act. 
a. Statutory Text 
Section 2510(16) defines “readily accessible to the 
general public” as it pertains specifically to “radio 
communication” by first establishing a presumption of 
ready accessibility and then defining five types of radio 
communications which would be expressly excluded 
from that presumption.  Notably, none of the five 
express exemptions from ready accessibility under 
Section 2510(16) specifically address wireless internet 
technologies, as the list predominantly addresses radio 
broadcast technologies.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(16)(A)-
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(E).  In addition to Section 2510(16), the Act uses the 
term “radio communication” on three other occasions.  
First, Section 2511(2)(g), which provides five 
exceptions to liability for intentional interception of 
wire, oral or electronic communications, makes it lawful 
to intentionally intercept: 
[A]ny radio communication which is transmitted— 
(I) by any station for the use of the general public, 
or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or 
person in distress; 
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil 
defense, private land mobile, or public safety 
communications system, including police and 
fire, readily accessible to the general public; 
(III) by a station operating on an authorized 
frequency within the bands allocated to the 
amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio 
services; or 
(IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications 
system; … . 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii).  Second, Section 2511(2)(g) 
also makes it lawful “for other users of the same 
frequency to intercept any radio communication made 
through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored 
by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of 
such system, if such communication is not scrambled or 
encrypted.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(v).  Finally, Section 
2511(5)(a)(i)(B) makes unlawful and authorizes a right 
of action for the federal government to bring suit in 
federal court for the interception of “a radio 
communication that is transmitted on frequencies 
allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the 
Federal Communications Commission that is not 
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scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of 
this chapter is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for 
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or 
private commercial gain.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(i)(B).  
Title 47, part 74 of the rules of the Federal 
Communications Commission pertains to 
“Experimental Radio, Auxiliary, Special Broadcast and 
Other Program Distributional Services.”  47 C.F.R. 
§ 74. Subpart D of part 74 regulates “Remote Pickup 
Broadcast Stations.”  Id.  Remote pickup broadcast 
stations are defined under the regulations as either a 
mobile or fixed “pickup broadcast transmitter, and its 
associated accessory equipment necessary to the radio 
communication function.”  47 C.F.R. § 74.401. 
The drafting of these provisions predated the 
spread of wireless internet technologies and, thus, the 
lack of any explicit reference to wireless internet 
technologies does not itself preclude an interpretation 
of “radio communications” that would include these 
later-developed technologies.  However, the usage of 
“radio communication” throughout the Act does not 
lend itself to a broad interpretation of the term.  In 
particular, references to “radio communication” 
throughout the Act predominantly pertain to and are 
drafted for the particular design of radio broadcast 
technologies, and do not address other communications 
technologies that transmit using radio waves.  For 
example, Section 2511(2)(g) makes it lawful to 
intentionally intercept any radio communication that 
“that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or person in 
distress,” without reference to whether such radio 
communication was readily accessible to the general 
public and not scrambled or encrypted.  Should the 
Court interpret radio communication so broadly within 
the Act to include such technologies as wireless 
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internet and cellular phones, this exception could lead 
to absurd results.  Specifically, pursuant to this 
interpretation, an unauthorized intentional monitoring 
of a cellular phone call could be lawful should the 
content of the communication relate to vehicles or 
persons in distress, but unlawful otherwise.  Further, 
Section 2511(2)(g) makes it lawful to intentionally 
intercept any radio communication transmitted by “any 
marine or aeronautical communications system,” which 
could lead to equally arbitrary results when applying 
the exception to communications technologies other 
than radio broadcast technologies, e.g., a Wi-Fi 
network aboard an airplane. 
b. Dictionary Reference 
Gleaning a plain meaning reading of “radio 
communication” from dictionary references is equally 
as inconclusive.  The Oxford Dictionaries Online 
(“ODO”) defines “radio” as “[t]he transmission and 
reception of electromagnetic waves of radio frequency, 
especially those carrying sound messages.”  Further, 
the ODO lists a number of more specific definitions for 
“radio”: (1) “the activity or industry of broadcasting 
sound programs”; (2) “radio programs”; (3) “an 
apparatus for receiving radio programs”; (4) “an 
apparatus capable of both receiving and transmitting 
radio messages between individuals, ships, planes, 
etc.”; (5) “ … a broadcasting station or channel.”  The 
ODO defines “communication,” in pertinent part, as 
“the imparting or exchanging of information or news.”  
However, the ODO, Merriam-Websters and the Oxford 
English Dictionary do not contain any definition for 
“radio communication” and, thus, fail to provide an 
authoritative interpretation for the compound 
formulation of the two words.  On one hand, Congress 
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could have intended “radio communication” to simply 
combine the definition of “radio” with the definition of 
“communication,” thereby creating a compound that 
incorporates all communications transmitted using 
radio waves.  Yet, on the other hand, Congress could 
have intended the compound of “radio” and 
“communication” to denote communications that 
involved a radio apparatus or a communication that 
solely involved the transmission of sound over radio 
waves.  Moreover, should Congress have intended the 
compound term “radio communication” to mean simply 
“communication by radio waves,” it could have so 
specified.  Rather, Congress chose to use the compound 
term, “radio communication,” a term that shares a 
likeness with other compound terms used throughout 
the Act that prefix “communication” with reference to 
a particular form of media; each of which are provided 
specialized definitions within the Act.  The Court now 
examines the statutory text to discern how Congress 
intended compound terms to modify the independent 
meaning of each word, if at all. 
c. Compound Terms 
While the ECPA does not define the compound 
term “radio communication,” the Act does provide 
definitions for three other compound terms that 
combine a form of media with the term 
“communication”: “wire communication,”5 “oral 
communication”6 and “electronic communication.”7  A 
“wire communication,” as defined by the Act, means: 
                                                 
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). 
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
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 [A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part 
through the use of facilities for the transmission of 
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other 
like connection between the point of origin and the 
point of reception (including the use of such 
connection in a switching station) furnished or 
operated by any person engaged in providing or 
operating such facilities for the transmission of 
interstate or foreign communications or 
communications affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
18 U.S.C. § 1210(1).  The Act defines “oral 
communication” as “any oral communication uttered by 
a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such 
term does not include any electronic communication.”  
18 U.S.C. § 1210(2).  Finally, an “electronic 
communication” is defined as: 
 [A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, 
but does not include— 
(A) any wire or oral communication; 
(B) any communication made through a tone-only 
paging device; 
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as 
defined in section 3117 of this title); 
or 
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by 
a financial institution in a communication 
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system used for the electronic storage and 
transfer of funds … . 
18 U.S.C. § 1210(12). 
In defining these compound terms, Congress 
intended more refined definitions than simply 
combining the independent meanings of each word into 
a unified whole, e.g., electronic communication is not 
defined as any communication transmitted by 
electronic means.  Rather, Congress provided nuanced 
definitions of each compound term; in part, to mitigate 
confusion in light of the inevitable overlap between 
terms.  For example, electronic communication 
expressly includes electronic communications 
transmitted in whole or in part by wire, but excludes 
wire communications.  Moreover, Congress did not 
define “wire communication” as any communication 
transmitted by wire, but limited the definition to 
incorporate solely “aural communications” transmitted 
by wire. Congress also expressly included 
communications transmitted in whole or in part by 
radio as a form of electronic communication, such that 
an interpretation of the compound “radio 
communication” as all communications by radio would 
render all communications technologies that transmit 
using radio waves electronic communications.  An 
interpretation of “radio communication” that 
presumptively included all technologies that transmit 
over radio waves, such as cellular phones, under the 
purview of electronic communications and held that 
technology bound by Section 2510(16)’s definition of 
“readily accessible to the general public,” would 
contravene Ninth Circuit precedent holding that 
cellular phone communications are wire 
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communications for purposes of the Wiretap Act.8  The 
Ninth Circuit based its holding on the legislative 
history of the Act, finding that, despite the apparent 
wireless nature of cellular telephones, Congress 
intended cellular phone technology to fall into the 
meaning of wire communication based on the fact that 
cellular phones transmit the communications over wire 
at some point during the course of the transmission.  Id. 
at 1138, n.12.  Rather than a simply interpret “wire 
communications” as all communications by wire, the 
Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended compound 
terms that prefixed “communication” with a type of 
media to have specialized and, at times, counter-
intuitive definitions.  In this case, Congress did not 
provide a specialized definition of “radio 
communication,” unlike wire, oral and electronic 
communication.  However, such an omission does not 
preclude a finding that Congress intended a more 
sophisticated compound meaning and, as consequence, 
the meaning of “radio communication” remains open to 
multiple interpretations. 
Thus, the Court finds that a plain reading of “radio 
communication” from the statutory text, as well as 
reading the text in the context of the structure and 
purpose of the Act, fails to yield a definitive and 
unambiguous result.  The Court now turns to the 
legislative history for clarification. 
2. Legislative History 
The ECPA was passed by Congress in 1986 to 
amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
                                                 
8 In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an 
Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral 
Communications, 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Action of 1968, commonly known as the Wiretap Act, in 
order to “update and clarify Federal privacy 
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes 
in new computer and telecommunications 
technologies.”  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986).  Prior to 
the amendment, Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act provided a private right 
of action for interception of communications, however, 
the statute was expressly limited to unauthorized aural 
interception of wire or oral communications.  Id. at 2.  
In 1986, the statute was, in the words of Senator 
Leahy, one of the senators who introduced the 
amendment, “hopelessly out of date.”  Id. 
In particular, Congress intended the 1986 
amendment to bring the statute in line with 
“technological developments and changes in the 
structure of the telecommunications industry.”  S. Rep. 
No. 99-541, at 2 (1986).  Congress explicitly 
acknowledged the new privacy concerns faced by 
individuals and businesses in light of developments in 
the personal and commercial computing industries.  Id. 
Developments of particular interest to the Senate 
Committee included the protection of privacy rights in 
offsite data storage, the computer-to-computer 
transmission of this data, and electronic mail.  Id.  In 
fact, the initial development of the amendment came on 
the heels of a 1984 interaction between Senator Leahy 
and the Attorney General where the Senator asked the 
Attorney General if electronic mail and computer-to-
computer communications were covered by the 
Wiretap Act.  Id.  In response, the Department of 
Justice expressed concern that in areas of rapid 
technological development, “distinctions such as 
[whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists] are not always clear or obvious.”  Id. at 3.  To 
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this end, Congress amended the Wiretap Act in order 
to provide statutory privacy protection and a civil right 
of action for interceptions of electronic communications, 
including, inter alia, computer-to-computer 
transmissions and electronic mail; contexts in which 
Congress suspected the Fourth Amendment may only 
dubiously apply.  Id. 
Another matter of importance to Congress in the 
drafting of the amendment was to address concerns 
expressed by radio hobbyists and users of radio 
scanners that the amendment would impose liability 
upon the innocent act of scanning radio broadcast 
frequencies in order to reach public communications, 
should the hobbyist inadvertently encroach upon 
protected communication that shares the same 
spectrum, for instance a cellular phone . S. Rep. No. 99-
541, at 4-5 (1986).  An earlier version of the amendment, 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1985, S. 
1667, did not include the Section 2510(16) definition of 
“readily accessible to the general public” and applied 
both exemptions G1 and G2 to “electronic 
communication,” without any use of the term “radio 
communication.”  131 Cong. Rec. S. 11795, at 4.  
Following a year of hearings, at which concerns were 
raised by radio hobbyists, Senator Leahy, joined by 
Senator Mathias, introduced a superseding version of 
the bill that incorporated explicit mention of “radio 
communication,” including Section 2510(6) and 
reference in exemption G2, as well as a heightened 
mens rea requirement from “willful” to “intentional” to 
find criminal liability for interception.  S. Rep. No. 99-
541, at 3, 5 (1986); 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04, at 18 (“In 
order to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, we modified 
the original language of S. 1667 to clarify that 
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intercepting traditional radio services is not 
unlawful.”). 
It was in light of these dual considerations that 
Congress drafted the text that became Sections 2510 
and 2511.  Section 2510(12) defines “electronic 
communication” as a broad category that includes “any 
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in 
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic 
or photooptical system … .”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).  As 
defined in the statute, a communication transmitted by 
radio is a specific type of electronic communication, 
such that exemption G1—which exempts from liability 
any interception of an electronic communication that is 
readily accessible to the general public—would exempt 
communications transmitted by radio as well, should 
those communications be “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2). 
However, to clarify that “intercepting traditional 
radio services” was not a violation of the Act in order to 
quiet the concerns raised by radio hobbyists, Congress 
added, inter alia, Section 2510(16).  See, e.g., 132 Cong. 
Rec. S7987-04, at 18.  Section 2510(16) provides a 
definition for “readily accessible to the general public” 
with respect to “radio communication” that establishes 
a presumption of accessibility, should the 
communication not fit within one of five delineated 
exceptions.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).  Notably, each of the 
five exceptions, as well as the presumption of 
accessibility, are drafted for the particular technology 
of traditional radio broadcast mediums and do not 
address any broader radio-based communications 
technology of the time, including cellular phones.  The 
first exception to the Section 2510(16) is for “scrambled 
or encrypted” communications, which the Senate 
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Report describes as “to convert the signal into 
unintelligible form by means intended to protect the 
contents of a communication from unintended 
recipients.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A); S. Rep. No. 99-
541, at 11 (1986).  The second exception is for 
communications that have been “transmitted using 
modulation techniques whose essential parameters 
have been withheld from the public with the intention 
of preserving the privacy of such communication.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2510(16)(B).  The Senate Report clarified that 
“paragraph (B) refers to spread spectrum radio 
communications,” which was a technology that allowed 
for the transmission of a signal on “different 
frequencies where the receiving station must possess 
the necessary algorythm [sic] in order to reassemble 
the signal.”  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 11 (1986).  The third 
exception is for communications “carried on a 
subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio 
transmission,” which, according to the Senate Report, 
included “data and background music services carried 
on FM subcarriers.”  Id. at 11-12.  The fourth exception 
is for communications that are “transmitted over a 
communication system provided by a common carrier,” 
excluding “tone only paging system communication.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(D).  The fifth exception was for 
communications that were transmitted on frequencies 
allocated under the Rules of the Federal 
Communications Commission for: (1) Part 25 (“Satellite 
Communications”); (2) subparts of Part 74 
(“Experimental Radio, Auxiliary, Special Broadcast 
and Other Program Distributional Services”); and (3) 
Part 94 (“Microwave Services”).  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(16)(E); 47 C.F.R. § 47(24), (74), (94). 
Although the ECPA never explicitly defines “radio 
communication,” what the legislative history and the 
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context of the term’s use in Section 2510(16) make clear 
is that Congress intended “radio communication” to 
include “traditional radio services,” such that public-
directed radio broadcast communication, as the 
technology was understood at the time, would be 
clearly excluded from liability under the Act.  What the 
legislative history also reveals, however, is that 
Congress did not intend “radio communications” to be 
defined so broadly such that it would encompass all 
communications transmitted over radio waves.  This 
was made explicit in the Senate Report’s consideration 
of cellular phone technology, which also uses radio 
waves to transmit communications, and the clear intent 
to include such technology under the protections of the 
Act as a “wire communication” without any express 
limitation by Section 2510(16).  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 6, 
11 (1986) (“Thus, a wire communication encompasses 
the whole of a voice telephone transmission even if part 
of the transmission is carried by fiber optic cable or by 
radio—as in the case of cellular telephones … .”). 
As the legislative history demonstrates, despite the 
insistence of radio scanning enthusiasts, Congress 
stopped short of including a full exception to liability 
under the Act for the willful monitoring of cellular 
telephone calls.9  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 6 (1986).  
According to the Senate Report, this hesitation was 
based on two considerations.  Id.  First, Congress had 
made willful monitoring of telephone calls illegal in the 
original 1968 Wiretap Act should at least part of the 
call pass through a wire.  Id.  Second, the design of the 
cellular phone technology made intentional monitoring 
                                                 
9 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04, 1986 WL 776264, at *18 (“Under 
this revised Electronic Communications Privacy bill, cellular 
phones, private and public microwave services and voice or display 
pagers are protected against interception.”). 
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of the communication more difficult than other signals 
commonly scanned.  Id.  Rather than exclude cellular 
phone communications from the protections of the act, 
the Senate Committee highlighted the possibility that 
the Federal Communications Commission should 
consider labeling cellular phone and radio scanning 
equipment to alert the user that such technologies are 
“radio-based communications” and, as such, intentional 
interception of the communication could violate the 
Wiretap Act.  Id. 
The presumption of accessibility established in 
Section 2510(16) for traditional radio broadcast 
technology was an appropriate response to the balance 
being struck between particular electronic forms of 
communication that were designed to be public, like 
traditional radio broadcast, and others that were 
designed to be private, like cellular phone technology.  
Id.  However, to apply the presumption to all 
communications transmitted using radio technology by 
interpreting “radio communication” broadly would 
contravene congressional intent to provide protection 
for technology like cellular phones, which use radio 
waves to transmit communications, but are architected 
in such a way as to be private. 
Thus, the Court finds that the legislative history 
and text of the statute demonstrate congressional 
intent to apply Section 2510(16)’s definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” to exemption G1, and 
not merely to limit the application of Section 2510(16) to 
“radio communications” in exemption G2.  However, in 
light of the legislative history and text of the statute, 
the Court also finds that Section 2510(16)’s 
presumption of accessibility and the requirement that a 
communications technology must fit within one of five 
exceptions were solely intended to apply to “traditional 
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radio services.”  To interpret Section 2510(16) so 
broadly as to apply its strict presumption of 
accessibility to all communications technology that uses 
radio waves, regardless of the technology’s design, 
would disregard explicit congressional intent to include 
cellular phone technology within the protections of the 
Act and clear Ninth Circuit precedent, holding that 
cellular phone technologies are, in fact, “wire 
communications.”10 Rather, for all electronic 
communications that could not be fairly classified as 
“traditional radio services,” or radio broadcast 
technology, regardless of the technology’s use of radio 
waves as the medium of transmission, the Court finds 
that Congress did not intend Section 2510(16)’s narrow 
definition of “readily accessible to the general public” to 
apply for purposes of exemption G1.  The Court now 
turns to examine the sufficiency of the pleadings in 
light of these findings. 
3. Sufficiency of the Pleadings 
Here, Plaintiffs allege in pertinent part: 
 Defendant intentionally intercepted electronic 
communications sent or received on wireless 
internet connections (“WiFi connections”) by the 
Class from at least May 25, 2007 through the 
present … .  (CCAC ¶ 1.)  Defendant intercepted 
the Class members’ electronic communications with 
its Google Street View vehicles.  (Id. ¶ 2.)  When 
Defendant’s engineers created the data collection 
system for its Google Street View vehicles, most 
commonly known as a packet analyzer or wireless 
                                                 
10 In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an 
Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral 
Communications, 349 F.3d at 1138, n.12. 
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sniffer, they intentionally included computer code 
in the system that was designed to and did sample, 
collect, decode, and analyze all types of data sent 
and received over the WiFi connections of class 
members.  (Id. ¶ 4.) 
 This data included Class members’ unique, 
secret WiFi network identifiers (known as Service 
Set Identifier or SSID) and unique WiFi router 
numbers (Media Access Control or MAC 
addresses).  (CCAC ¶ 4.)  The data also included all 
or part of any personal emails, passwords, videos, 
audio, documents, and Voice Over Internet 
Protocol (“VOIP”) information (collectively, 
“payload data”) transmitted over Class members’ 
WiFi networks in which plaintiffs had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  (Id.)  The WiFi networks 
from which the Google Street View vehicles 
collected payload data were not configured so that 
such data were reasonably accessible by the 
general public.  (Id. ¶ 5.)  Indeed, the data, as 
captured by the wireless sniffer, are not even 
readable by members of the public absent use of 
sophisticated decoding and processing technology.  
(Id.) 
Based on the allegations above, the Court finds 
that Plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to state a claim for 
violation of the Wiretap Act.  In particular, Plaintiffs 
plead that Defendant intentionally created, approved 
of, and installed specially-designed software and 
technology into its Google Street View vehicles and 
used this technology to intercept Plaintiffs’ data 
packets, arguably electronic communications, from 
Plaintiffs’ personal Wi-Fi networks.  Further, Plaintiffs 
plead that the data packets were transmitted over Wi-
Fi networks that were configured such that the packets 
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were not readable by the general public without the use 
of sophisticated packet sniffer technology.  Although 
Plaintiffs fail to plead that the wireless networks fall 
into at least one of the five enumerated exceptions to 
Section 2510(16)’s definition of “readily accessible to the 
general public” for radio communications, the Court 
finds that the wireless networks were not readily 
accessible to the general public as defined by the 
particular communication system at issue, wireless 
internet networks, which are not “radio 
communications,” as the term was intended by 
Congress in drafting Section 2510(16). 
Rather, application of the Section 2510(16) 
definition of “readily accessible to the general public” 
as narrowly defined for traditional radio broadcast 
technology, would be inapplicable to the determination 
of whether Plaintiffs’ allegedly intercepted data 
packets from their Wi-Fi networks are readily 
accessible to the general public for purposes of 
exemption G1, despite the fact that wireless networks 
transmit data using radio waves.  As the Court has 
found, Congress intended Section 2510(16)’s definition 
to resolve the issue of radio scanning devices used to 
intercept radio broadcasts by establishing a 
presumption that traditional radio services were 
“readily accessible to the general public,” in accord with 
the design of the medium as one where most 
communications over that medium are intended to be 
public.  Unlike in the traditional radio services context, 
communications sent via Wi-Fi technology, as pleaded 
by Plaintiffs, are not designed or intended to be public.  
Rather, as alleged, Wi-Fi technology shares a common 
design with cellular phone technology, in that they both 
use radio waves to transmit communications, however 
they are both designed to send communications 
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privately, as in solely to select recipients, and both 
types of technology are architected in order to make 
intentional monitoring by third parties difficult.  S. 
Rep. No. 99-541, at 6 (1986). 
Further, applying Section 2510(16)’s narrow 
definition of “readily accessible to the general public” to 
wireless networks, a technology unknown to the 99th 
Congress who drafted and passed the ECPA, would 
contravene the primary stated purpose of the 
amendment, which was to update the Wiretap Act to 
include within the Act specific protections against 
intentional interceptions of computer-to-computer 
communications and so-called “electronic mail” or 
email; data Plaintiffs plead was included in the data 
packets intercepted by Defendant.  Interpreting the 
ECPA such that the statute provides obscure 
limitations on the protection of emails and other 
computer-to-computer communications based on the 
particular medium that transmitted the electronic 
communication would render the Wiretap Act, and the 
efforts of the 99th Congress to provide such 
protections, absurd.  Under such an interpretation, the 
Act would provide a private civil right of action, and 
even impose criminal liability, for the interception of 
emails transmitted over an ethernet cable through a 
wired network, but would stop short at protecting 
those very same emails should they pass momentarily 
over radio waves through a Wi-Fi network established 
to transmit data within a home.  Such an interpretation 
cannot pass muster in the face of an explicit limitation 
that Section 2510(16)’s specialized definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” solely apply to “radio 
communications,” a term undefined within the 
statutory text, and where the legislative history of the 
Act makes plain that Congress intended “radio 
94a 
 
communications” to mean traditional radio services or 
broadcast radio. 
Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs fail to state a 
claim for violation of the Wiretap Act, as Plaintiffs 
plead that their networks were “open” and 
“unencrypted,” is misplaced.  (Motion at 8-11.)  While 
Plaintiffs plead that their networks, or electronic 
communications systems, were configured such that the 
general public may join the network and readily 
transmit electronic communications across that 
network to the Internet, Plaintiffs plead that the 
networks were themselves configured to render the 
data packets, or electronic communications, unreadable 
and inaccessible without the use of rare packet sniffing 
software; technology allegedly outside the purview of 
the general public.  Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs 
plead facts sufficient to support a claim that the Wi-Fi 
networks were not “readily accessible to the general 
public,” such that exemption G1 would not apply. 
Defendant’s interpretation of United States v. 
Ahrndt11 as standing for the principle that all 
unencrypted wireless networks are readily accessible 
to the general public and, thus, any interceptions from 
those networks are obviated from liability under 
exemption G1, unduly extends the doctrine.  (Motion at 
10-11.)  In Ahrndt, a neighbor was connected to the 
Internet via her own wireless network when her 
network malfunctioned and her computer automatically 
logged in to another open wireless network operated by 
the defendant.  Id. at *1.  The defendant had 
administered his iTunes software as set to “share,” 
such that other users on the same network would be 
able to access all files that the defendant had stored in 
                                                 
11 No. 08-468, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010). 
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his iTunes libaries.  Id.  After being automatically 
logged into the defendant’s wireless network, the 
plaintiff in Ahrndt began using her own iTunes 
program and noticed that the defendant’s iTunes 
library was accessible.  Id.  In accessing the defendant’s 
iTunes library, the plaintiff located a number of files 
containing child pornography in a subfolder within the 
shared directory.  Id.  Based on these facts, Judge King 
held that the plaintiff’s interception was not illegal and 
was, in fact, “expressly lawful” under the Wiretap Act 
as the defendant’s network and iTunes software were 
configured to be readily accessible to the general 
public.  Id. at *8.  However, the court did not base its 
holding merely on the fact the defendant’s network was 
unencrypted.  Id.  Rather, Judge King found that 
“defendant’s conduct in operating his iTunes software 
with the preferences set to share, in conjunction with 
maintaining an unsecured wireless network router, 
diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy to the 
point that society would not recognize it as reasonable.”  
Id. at *8.  Unlike in Ahrndt, here, Plaintiffs plead that, 
although the networks themselves were unencrypted, 
the networks were configured to prevent the general 
public from gaining access to the data packets without 
the assistance of sophisticated technology.  (CCAC ¶ 5.)  
Thus, the Court finds that, without more, merely 
pleading that a network is unencrypted does not render 
that network readily accessible to the general public 
and serve to remove the intentional interception of 
electronic communications from that network from 
liability under the ECPA. 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for 
violation of the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 
et seq. 
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B. State Wiretap Statutes 
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause 
of Action for violation of various state wiretap statutes 
on the grounds that claims under state wiretap statutes 
are preempted by the Federal Wiretap Act on express, 
field and conflict preemption grounds. (Motion at 12-
16.) 
“Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, federal law can preempt and 
displace state law through: (1) express preemption; (2) 
field preemption (sometimes referred to as complete 
preemption); and (3) conflict preemption.”  Ting v. 
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted).  “Express preemption exists where Congress 
enacts an explicit statutory command that state law be 
displaced.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “Absent explicit 
preemptive text, we may still infer preemption based 
on field or conflict preemption … .”  Id.  A court may 
find that federal law displaces state law on field 
preemption grounds “when the federal statutory 
scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to infer that 
Congress left no room for supplementary regulation by 
the states.”  Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor 
Cty. Washington v. Idacorp, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 647 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted).  “When 
the federal government completely occupies a given 
field or an identifiable portion of it … , the test of 
preemption is whether ‘the matter on which the state 
asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the 
federal government.’”  Id. (citations and quotations 
omitted).  However, “[i]n all cases, congressional intent 
to preempt state law must be clear and manifest.”  In 
re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
97a 
 
Here, the Court finds that, while the ECPA 
contains no express preemptive statement on the part 
of Congress,12 the ECPA was intended to 
comprehensively regulate the interception of electronic 
communications such that the scheme leaves no room in 
which the states may further regulate.  See Bunnell v. 
Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 
1154-55 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  In particular, the ECPA was 
enacted, in part, to provide legal certainty to users and 
developers of innovative communications technologies 
with bright line rules for liability.  S. Rep. 99-541 at 4.  
In so regulating, Congress struck a balance between 
the right to the privacy of one’s electronic 
communications against the ability of users to access 
communications technologies without fear of liability 
for inadvertent interception.  S. Rep. 99-541 at 5-6.  
State regulation acting in addition to the ECPA might 
serve to obscure the legislative scheme surrounding 
innovative communications technologies that Congress 
intended to clarify through the Act, or could serve to 
upset the fragile balance considered by Congress 
between those who transmit electronic communications 
and those who may inadvertently intercept those 
communications.  Further, the statute provides for 
                                                 
12 The Court finds that Defendant’s interpretation of Section 
2518(10)(c) as an express preemption clause misinterprets the 
provision.  (Motion at 13.)  The legislative history supports the 
proposition that the provision was appended to the ECPA solely to 
address suppression of evidence by criminal defendants.  In re 
NSA Telecomms. Records Order Litigation, 483 F. Supp. 2d 934, 
939 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Walker, J.) (holding that Section 2518(10)(c) 
was drafted with the limited intent to prevent “criminal 
defendants from suppressing evidence based on electronic 
communications or customer records obtained in violation of 
ECPA’s provisions”).  Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt 
Defendant’s position. 
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criminal penalties, as well as a civil right of action for 
violation of its provisions, such that the statute 
provides broad protections for interceptions under the 
Act.  Thus, the Court finds that the federal Wiretap 
Act preempts state wiretap statutory schemes. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for 
violation of various state wiretap statutes with 
prejudice. 
C. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. 
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 
Cause of Action for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§§ 17200, et seq., on the grounds that claim is 
preempted by the Federal Wiretap Act on express, 
field and conflict preemption grounds; and (2) assuming 
arguendo that the claim is not preempted, Plaintiffs fail 
to state a claim and fail to plead Proposition 64 
standing.  (Motion at 17-19.)  The Court addresses each 
ground in turn. 
1. Preemption 
At issue is whether Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., is preempted 
by the federal Wiretap Act. 
Here, unlike in the context of the state wiretap 
statutes, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., does 
not seek to regulate the same field as the federal 
Wiretap Act. Rather, the statute was intended to 
broadly enable “tribunals to enjoin wrongful business 
conduct in whatever context such activity might occur.”  
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass’n., 7 Cal. 3d 94, 
111 (Cal. 1972).  To this end, Section 17200’s prohibition 
of “unlawful” acts does not proscribe specified conduct; 
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rather, the statute incorporates violations of other 
substantive law as the basis for imposing liability in 
order to address the added harm to the marketplace of 
undertaking such violations in a business context.  Cal-
Tech Comm’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 
Cal. 4th 163, 180 (Cal. 1999).  Further, the Federal 
Wiretap Act provides no additional protection or 
particular civil right of action for interceptions that 
result in anticompetitive conduct or harm to the 
market, nor do such additional protections conflict with 
the stated purpose of the ECPA. 
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Second Cause 
of Action for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§§ 17200, et seq., is not preempted by the federal 
Wiretap Act. 
2. Proposition 64 Standing 
At issue is whether Plaintiffs have properly 
pleaded Proposition 64 standing sufficient to support 
their Second Cause of Action for violations of Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. 
To have standing to state a claim for violation of 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., as amended by 
the 2004 passage of Proposition 64, a plaintiff must 
establish that he has suffered an “injury in fact” and 
has “lost money or property as a result of such unfair 
competition.”  Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal. App. 4th 847, 
852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  Further, allegations of an 
invasion of privacy are insufficient to invoke 
Proposition 64 standing.  Ruiz v. Gap, 540 F. Supp. 2d 
1121, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege in pertinent part: 
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Plaintiffs and National Class members have 
suffered injury in fact and lost property as a result 
of the unfair and unlawful business practices. 
(CCAC ¶ 138.) 
Based on the allegations above, the Court finds 
that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to support 
Proposition 64 standing.  In particular, interception of 
data packets that a plaintiff has sent over a wireless 
network are not lost property for purposes of 
determining Proposition 64 standing.  Such an 
indefinite claim of lost property would circumvent the 
intent of voters, when passing the amendment, to 
increase the pleading requirements to state a claim for 
Section 17200 violation.  Further, Plaintiffs contentions 
that merely incurring attorney fees and expenses as a 
result of bringing a Section 17200 claim are equally 
inapposite,13 and would effectively eviscerate the 
heightened standing requirements of Proposition 64. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action 
for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., 
without prejudice to Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings 
to add facts sufficient to support Proposition 64 
standing, if so desired.14 
                                                 
13 (Opp’n at 25.) 
14 In amending its UCL claim, Plaintiffs must also allege more 
than a loss of personal information. A plaintiff’s “personal 
information” does not constitute property under the UCL.  
Thompson v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 07cv1058 IEG, 2007 WL 
2746603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as follows: 
(1) The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to 
Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for violation of 
the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, et 
seq.; 
(2) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for 
violation of various state wiretap statutes with 
prejudice; and 
(3) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for 
violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et 
seq., with leave to amend. 
On or before August 1, 2011, Plaintiffs shall file an 
Amended Complaint consistent with the terms of this 
Order. 
Dated: June 29, 2011 /s/  James Ware  
JAMES WARE 
United States District Chief Judge 
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APPENDIX D 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
18 U.S.C. § 2510.  Definitions 
* * * 
(16) “readily accessible to the general public” 
means, with respect to a radio communication, that 
such communication is not— 
(A) scrambled or encrypted; 
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques 
whose essential parameters have been withheld 
from the public with the intention of preserving the 
privacy of such communication; 
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal 
subsidiary to a radio transmission; 
(D) transmitted over a communication system 
provided by a common carrier, unless the 
communication is a tone only paging system 
communication; or 
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under 
part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of 
the Rules of the Federal Communications 
Commission, unless, in the case of a communication 
transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 74 
that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast 
auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way 
voice communication by radio; 
* * * 
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18 U.S.C. §2511.  Interception and disclosure of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
chapter any person who— 
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to 
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept 
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication; 
* * * 
[(2)](g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter 
or chapter 121 of this title for any person— 
(i) to intercept or access an electronic 
communication made through an electronic 
communication system that is configured so that 
such electronic communication is readily accessible 
to the general public; 
(ii) to intercept any radio communication which 
is transmitted— 
(I) by any station for the use of the general 
public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, 
vehicles, or persons in distress; 
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, 
civil defense, private land mobile, or public 
safety communications system, including police 
and fire, readily accessible to the general 
public; 
(III) by a station operating on an 
authorized frequency within the bands 
allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or 
general mobile radio services; or 
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(IV) by any marine or aeronautical 
communications system; 
(iii) to engage in any conduct which— 
(I) is prohibited by section 633 of the 
Communications Act of 1934; or 
(II) is excepted from the application of 
section 705(a) of the Communications Act of 
1934 by section 705(b) of that Act; 
(iv) to intercept any wire or electronic 
communication the transmission of which is causing 
harmful interference to any lawfully operating 
station or consumer electronic equipment, to the 
extent necessary to identify the source of such 
interference; or 
(v) for other users of the same frequency to 
intercept any radio communication made through a 
system that utilizes frequencies monitored by 
individuals engaged in the provision or the use of 
such system, if such communication is not 
scrambled or encrypted. 
* * * 
